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FREEDOM FROM INCARCERATION:
WHY IS THIS RIGHT DIFFERENT
FROM ALL OTHER RIGHTS?
SH-ERRY F. COLB*
American constitutional jurisprudence has long accepted the notion that the exer-
cise of certain rights can only be restricted by the government if the restriction satis-
fies strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court has identified such rights as fundamentat
often by relying on an expansive interpretation of the word "liberty" in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendmenL In this Article, Professor Colb argues
that the Supreme Court has failed to recognize the right to physical liberty itself as a
fundamental right She demonstrates tha4 at presen4 conduct that is not itself con-
stitutionally protected may serve as the basis for imprisonmen4 even if the govern-
ment lacks a compelling interest in preventing the conducL Professor Colb argues
that a governmental decision to restrict a person's fundamental freedom from incar-
ceration, like the decision to restrict any other fundamental right, should be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny. She demonstrates the inadequacy of possible justifications
for the Supreme Court's present failure to protect the freedom from incarceration.
Finally, Professor Colb begins the process of scrutinizing decisions to incarcerate
by positing possible applications of her theory.
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INTRODUCMION
In March 1994, a Singapore court sentenced Michael Fay, an
eighteen-year-old United States citizen, to be. caned for spraying graf-
fiti on cars and committing other acts of vandalism.1 The procedure
was to involve "six skin-splitting strokes on the bare buttocks with a
half-inch-thick, four-foot rattan cane."2 In the months following Fay's
sentencing, many public officials and commentators in the United
States wrote letters and articles denouncing the government of Singa-
pore for its cruelty and pleading with the government to have mercy
on Michael Fay and spare him this penalty.3 The pleading was to little
avail, however. Fay was caned on May 5, 1994.4
The caning episode brought to light a debate that surfaces from
time to time in the United States. If we caned people in America for
graffiti, said some, perhaps Americans would have greater respect for
the law and our crime rate would be lower.5 Perhaps, said others, but
the price would be too high. In this country, we have individual rights,
and our Constitution stands in the way of those who would like to
create a police state. Disorder is sometimes the price of liberty.6 If
Michael Fay had committed his crime in America, said the defenders
of liberty, the Constitution would have protected him from the bar-
baric punishments of Singapore.7
If Michael Fay had smoked a marijuana cigarette in this country
(instead of spraying graffiti in Singapore), he could have lost his lib-
I William Branigin, American Teenager Awaits Caning in Orderly, Unbending Singa-
pore, Wash. Post, Apr. 13, 1994, at A20.
2 Id.
3 See id. (discussing public debate over Fay's sentence).
4 William Branigin, Parents Voice Outrage After Son's Caning, Condition Described,
Wash. Post, May 7, 1994, at A13. Fay's sentence was reduced from six lashes to four as a
concession to President Clinton's clemency plea. Singapore's Shame, Wash. Post, May 7,
1994, at A18.
5 See, e.g., S.R. Nathan, Free For All - When in Singapore .. , Wash. Post, Apr. 2,
1994, at A15.
6 See, e.g., "Justice" in Singapore, Wash. Post, Apr. 11, 1994, at A18.
7 See id.
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erty from confinement for up to a year, assuming no prior drug con-
victions.8 Indeed, there is every reason to believe that Congress or
any state legislature could, if it so desired, pass a statute that would
subject people who spray graffiti, possess marijuana, or park on the
wrong side of the street to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole, consistent with the Supreme Court's reading of the Constitu-
tion.9 In the United States, so long as a statutory prohibition does not
implicate constitutionally protected conduct, the convict may always
be subjected to a prison sentence. Though our courts provide proce-
dural protections to ensure that the facts of every case are fairly adju-
dicated, they do not substantively scrutinize the necessity and value of
a particular criminal law even though a person's liberty from incarcer-
ation hangs in the balance. While many of us were outraged by the
notion of caning graffiti artists and are confident (or at least hopeful)
that some part of the Bill of Rights would prevent a similar occur-
rence in this country, we do not sufficiently scrutinize the penalty of
incarceration as a deprivation of the fundamental right to be free from
physical confinement.
This Article explains and criticizes the courts' failure to address
imprisonment as a serious incursion on an individual's constitutionally
protected liberty. At first glance, this critique may strike the reader as
radical, in light of the ubiquitous nature of imprisonment in our crimi-
nal justice system. In fact, however, the thesis of the Article does not
call for the destabilization of the institution of imprisonment for those
committing offenses that frustrate a compelling governmental interest.
Such offenses would indisputably include, but would not be limited to,
violent acts like murder and assault. The Article instead calls for a
close examination of laws providing for the incarceration of individu-
als whose actions violate the criminal law but do not otherwise cause
serious harm to society's interests. This approach would render the
Court's current analysis of the criminal law consistent with its well-
8 Under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), the statutory maximum prison
sentence for simple possession of a controlled substance (when there are no prior drug
convictions) is one year imprisonment. However, in the case of possession of a mixture or
substance that contains cocaine base (i.e., crack), the maximum prison sentence is 20 years
imprisonment if it is a first conviction and the mixture or substance is more than five
grams. See also United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 2D2.1 (1994)
(providing penalties for simple possession of narcotics that depend on type of drug in-
volved and presence of prior convictions).
9 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95 (1991) (finding that sentence of life
in prison without possibility of parole for possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine did
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, despite defendant's status as first-time felon).
Although Harnelin did not expressly overrule Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983)
(holding that eighth amendment proscribes life sentence without parole for seventh nonvi-
olent felony), it appears to have done so sub silentio.
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developed doctrine regarding civil commitment of the mentally ill.
The Article works from the premise that a law cannot deprive individ-
uals of fundamental rights without strong substantive justification and
that this required justification cannot consist of the mere fact that the
law is a criminal law.10
Part I contrasts the United States Supreme Court's approach to
deprivations of liberty from confinement with its approach to other
deprivations of fundamental rights derived from the substantive "lib-
erty" portion of the due process clause. While subjecting other funda-
mental rights deprivations to strict scrutiny, the Court analyzes
deprivations of liberty from confinement using only rational basis
scrutiny.
Part II considers the argument that the procedural requirement
of "notice" that must accompany all criminal statutes distinguishes
prison from other fundamental rights deprivations. Part H concludes,
however, that the notice requirement does not adequately justify the
lower level of scrutiny applied to prison as opposed to other substan-
tive due process fights deprivations.
Part III then outlines three possible but problematic justifications
for refusing to apply strict scrutiny to incarceration: first, if we can
prohibit the act, we can imprison the actor; second, an abundance of
procedural protection can substitute for substantive constitutional
protection; and third, courts must defer to the legislative branches in
criminal matters in the same way as they defer to the executive branch
in military matters. These notions may explain, but ultimately prove
incapable of justifying, the disparate treatment of the deprivation of
liberty from incarceration. Part III therefore concludes that the Court
should apply strict scrutiny when evaluating criminal laws imposing
imprisonment as a penalty.
10 One might wonder why this thesis would not apply equally to property, since the
fourteenth amendment lists "property" along with "liberty" as protected by due process.
See U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law ...."). The answer is that the thesis does not
proceed from a textual observation that the due process clause lists "liberty" or from an
historical argument that the Framers believed liberty to be a protected fundamental right.
It proceeds from a contemporary constitutional law perspective, according to which (1)
there are a limited number of rights that are deemed "fundamental"; (2) these rights can-
not be burdened without compelling justification; (3) under the current doctrine and under
any view of ordered liberty, such rights include freedom from physical confinement; and
(4) the current doctrine should be true to the first three premises. None of this analysis
entails the proposition that property is as important as liberty. On the contrary, our cur-
rent doctrine reflects the view that freedom from confinement is of greater constitutional
significance than property rights. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367-68 (1970)
(requiring that guilt be proven beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases (which typically
involve possibility of incarceration), even though civil cases (which typically involve mone-
tary damages) require proof by preponderance of evidence).
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Part IV sets forth a model of how strict scrutiny might operate in
the context of the right to liberty from incarceration and addresses
some of the potential practical problems that might arise if such a
model were adopted by the courts.
I
THE INCONSISTENCY
The Supreme Court subjects deprivations of fundamental rights
to the most exacting standard of strict scrutiny. An individual's inter-
est in being free of physical confinement is a fundamental right. As
this Part will demonstrate, deprivations of the right of physical liberty
should therefore be subjected to strict scrutiny analysis. This Part also
demonstrates, however, that this fundamental right has been treated
differently from all other fundamental fights under the Court's
jurisprudence.
A. Fundamental Rights Doctrine
In examining laws claimed to violate constitutionally protected
individual rights, the Supreme Court has recognized some rights as
"fundamental." These rights include those enumerated explicitly in
the Constitution as well as those that the Court has recognized as es-
sential to the "liberty" protected by the fourteenth and fifth amend-
ment due process clauses." No government in the United States,
then, may deprive its citizens of "liberty"-however that is defined-
in the absence of "due process.' 2
Under Supreme Court precedent, a law or policy that burdens a
fundamental right is invalid if it does not meet the exacting standards
of "strict scrutiny."'1 3 Strict scrutiny requires that state action limiting
the exercise of a fundamental right serve a compelling governmental
11 See note 15 infra (listing rights protected as fundamental).
12 The due process requirement is both substantive and procedural. See Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-61 (1887) (first recognizing that due process includes substantive
as well as procedural component); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2804 (1992) (stating that due process clause is not exclusively procedural); Duncan v. Loui-
siana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-58 (1968) (incorporating against states right to jury trial through
fourteenth amendment); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (incorporating against
states fifth amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination through four-
teenth amendment); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (incorporating against
states fourth amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure through fourteenth
amendment).
13 See note 15 infra (citing specific instances of application of fundamental rights strict
scrutiny). For a thorough discussion of strict scrutiny as a standard of judicial review, see
Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 16-7 to -12, at 1454-65 (2d ed. 1988).
For an attack on the Supreme Court's application of "interest scrutiny" as a systematically
unprincipled and incoherent approach to balancing, see Hans A. Linde, Who Must Know
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interest and be the least restrictive means to serve that end.14 The
Supreme Court has employed the standard of strict scrutiny to analyze
a wide variety of restrictions on individual conduct.15
What, When, and How: The Systematic Incoherence of "Interest" Scrutiny, in Public Val-
ues in Constitutional Law 219 (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993).
Although the application of strict scrutiny inevitably entails subjective value judg-
ments, this fact does not, in my view, delegitimize the enterprise of applying the compelling
interest test. The determination of the scope of constitutional rights requires interpreta-
tion and elaboration. Because article M of the Constitution grants federal judges the
power and the responsibility of interpreting and applying the law, it follows that to
whatever extent "judging" includes subjective value judgments, it is the courts' responsibil-
ity to make these judgments.
In requiring judges to review claims of constitutional right, I would favor the judicial
employment of a harm model, one deriving from the proposition that criminal prohibitions
should be limited to behavior causing harm to others. See generally Joel Feinberg, The
Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harmless Wrongdoing (1988). My preferred harm
model, however, is not absolute. I would permit the criminal law to pursue purely moral
ends but would claim that such ends do not constitute compelling governmental interests
that would justify burdening a fundamental right such as the right to freedom from
incarceration.
14 See L. Tribe, supra note 13, §§ 16-7 to -12, at 1454-65 (discussing application of strict
scrutiny); see also cases cited in note 15 infra.
15 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,
2233-34 (1993) (invalidating ordinance banning ritual animal sacrifice); R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547-49 (1992) (invalidating law singling out conduct expressing
message of specified types of group-animus as viewpoint-based discrimination); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 402-20 (1989) (invalidating law banning flag-desecration as view-
point-based restriction against message of contempt for government); Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (recognizing that "certain kinds of highly personal
relationships" should be afforded special associational protection under the Constitution);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,383-87 (1978) (reaffirming fundamental right to marry);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973) (holding that because woman's right to decide
whether to terminate pregnancy is fundamental, only compelling interest can justify state
regulation which impairs that right); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2819
(1992) (modifying Roe standard by holding that law which burdens right to abortion may
be upheld if it is neither designed to, nor has the effect of, creating an undue burden on
woman's ability to choose to terminate pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-
56 (1972) (extending recognition of fundamental right to contraception to the unmarried);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (finding that durational residency re-
quirements for welfare unjustifiably burden right of interstate travel); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating antimiscegenation law as denying equality with respect
to fundamental right to marry); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
666-68 (1966) (invalidating poll tax providing differential access to the vote based on
wealth); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (noting that marriage is "right
of privacy older than the Bill of Rights" and recognizing fundamental rights of procreation
and use of contraception); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963) (holding that
first amendment free exercise clause requires that unemployment compensation be ex-
tended to unemployed individuals who could not work on Saturday for religious reasons);
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (prohibiting sterilization
of thief on ground that because procreation is fundamental right, government entity de-
priving some but not others of right to procreate must justify that differential treatment by
showing that it is narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interest); Meyer v. Nebraska,
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The fundamental rights recognized by the Court have been de-
rived primarily from the fourteenth amendment due process clause,
either by extending the application of liberties explicitly enumerated
in the Bill of Rights to action of the states through the incorporation
doctrine, 16 or as unenumerated liberties.17 These substantive due pro-
cess rights have been recognized as "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."' 8 One consequence of recognizing these rights as implicit in
the word "liberty" is that "liberty" in the due process clause means
more than just freedom from incarceration.19
B. Liberty from Confinement as a Fundamental Right
The Supreme Court has long recognized that liberty from con-
finement is a fundamental right. In Meyer v. Nebraska,2 0 the Court
said that
[w]ithout doubt, [the liberty defined by the fourteenth amendment]
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occu-
pations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dic-
tates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.2 l
262 U.S. 390,399 (1923) (recognizing right to "marry, establish a home, and bring up chil-
dren" as central to liberty protected by due process clause).
16 See, e.g., Duncan, 391 U.S. at 147-58 (incorporating sixth amendment right to trial by
jury); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 219-26 (1967) (incorporating sixth amend-
ment right to speedy trial); Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8 (incorporating fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 336-45 (1963) (incorporat-
ing sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 643-60
(1961) (holding that evidence obtained by searches and seizures which violate fourth
amendment is inadmissible in state courts).
17 The enumerated rights that individuals have against the federal government can be
found in the first eight amendments to the Constitution, and unenumerated rights are de-
rived from the fifth amendment due process clause and arguably, the ninth amendment.
Is Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Over the years, the standard for
determining whether a particular right is fundamental under the due process clause has
become less stringent. See L. Tfribe, supra note 13, § 11-2, at 773 (describing this liberali-
zation in context of incorporation of Bill of Rights). The precise standard to be applied in
determining whether a right is fundamental is not of critical importance for our purposes
though, because under any measure, however restrictive, the liberty from physical confine-
ment would qualify as a fundamental right.
19 See, e.g., Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2859 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment and
dissenting in part) ("In construing the phrase 'liberty' incorporated in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we have recognized that its meaning extends be-
yond freedom from physical restraint.").
20 262 U.S. 390,399-401 (1923) (holding law prohibiting teaching of foreign language to
young children unconstitutional under fourteenth amendment).
21 Id. at 399 (citations omitted).
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Implicit in this statement is the presupposition that "freedom from
bodily restraint" is a component of the substantive right to "liberty"
enumerated in the due process clause. Although the Court's view that
liberty extended beyond this core to protect the right to contract has
been rejected categorically, 22 the idea that liberty of person is a neces-
sary component of the fourteenth amendment's protection of liberty
has not been questioned.
Twenty-eight years before Meyer was decided, the first Justice
Harlan, dissenting in Hooper v. California,23 quoted an early New
York case stating that
"[1liberty, in its broad sense[,] as understood in this country, means
the right, not only of freedom from actual servitude, imprison-
ment[,] or restraint, but the right of one to use his faculties in all
lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in
any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or avocation." 24
As in Meyer, the implicit and undisputed premise is that while one
might take a broad or narrow view of liberty, the word "liberty," with-
out question, encompasses the freedom from confinement.25
22 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-93, 395-96 (1937) (holding
that liberty guaranteed under Constitution is not "absolute and uncontrollable," and per-
mits regulation of contracts in public interest, and overruling Adkins v. Children's Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525 (1923)).
23 155 U.S. 648 (1895).
24 Id. at 662-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Application of Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98,
106 (1885)) (alterations and emphasis in original).
25 For the origins of this notion, consider the following theory:
The phrase, "life, liberty or property without due process of law" came to us
from English common law; and there seems to be little question that, under the com-
mon law, the word "liberty" meant simply "liberty of the person" or, in other words,
"the right to have one's person free from physical restraint." ...
It is unquestionable that when the First Congress adopted the Fifth Amendment
and inserted the Due Process Clause, they took it directly from the then existing
State Constitutions, and they took it with the meaning it then bore.
Charles Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 Harv. L. Rev.
431, 440 (1926) (developing this theory at length). Professor Monaghan has observed that
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), abandoned the generous view of "life,
liberty and property" in the procedural due process context, in favor of analyzing sepa-
rately the specific words in the phrase in a manner that did not include "the full range of
state conduct having serious impact upon individual interests." Henry L. Monaghan, Of
"Liberty" and "Property," 62 Cornell L. Rev. 405,409 (1977). Even under this parsimoni-
ous reading of the due process clause, however, the word "liberty" would still surely in-
clude freedom from physical restraint. See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 692
(1888) (Field, J., dissenting) ("As said by the Court of Appeals of New York, in People v.
Marx, 'The term "liberty," as protected by the Constitution, is not cramped into a mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, as by incarceration, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to be free in the enjoyment of the faculties with which
he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the
common welfare'... ." (quoting People v. Marx, 2 N.E. 29, 33 (N.Y. 1885))); Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 142 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting) ("By the term 'liberty,' as used in [the
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In addition to recognizing the fundamental status of liberty in the
process of defining or refusing to define other rights as fundamental,
the Supreme Court has specifically addressed the substantive right to
liberty in the context of civil commitment of the mentally ill. In
Parham v. J.R.,26 for example, the Court recognized a child's "sub-
stantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily." 27 In
O'Connor v. Donaldson,2 8 the Court held that an adult who does not
present a danger to herself or to others, but who is nonetheless con-
fined in a state mental hospital, suffers a deprivation of her constitu-
tional right to liberty from physical confinement.2 9
In the process of considering whether the harmless mentally ill
might be confined, the O'Connor Court addressed the argument that
the state interest in improving a patient's standard of living justifies
the civil commitment. "That the State has a proper interest in provid-
ing care and assistance to the unfortunate goes without saying."30
Nonetheless, the Court rejected this interest as a basis for confine-
ment, noting that a person who is mentally ill might prefer her own
home "to the comforts of an institution."' 31 The Court similarly re-
jected the notion that the mentally ill might be confined to protect the
public from exposure to them. "Mere public intolerance or animosity
cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical
liberty."32
In order to justify such a deprivation, then, the state must have a
stronger interest necessitating that confinement than the merely "le-
gitimate" interest in improving the citizens' comfort level. The state
needs an interest as strong as that present when the relevant individ-
ual poses a danger to herself or to others.3 3 As the Court said in
due process clause], something more is meant than mere freedom from physical restraint
or the bounds of a prison."). The dissent in Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452
U.S. 18,41 n.8 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), similarly accused the majority of "empha-
sizing the value of physical liberty to the exclusion of all other fundamental interests." See
also id. at 40 (challenging Court's apparent belief "that physical confinement is the only
loss of liberty grievous enough to trigger a right to appointed counsel under the Due Pro-
cess Clause"). Though the more expansive view of liberty may have generally been a dis-
senting view, neither dissents nor majorities treated as controversial the basic proposition
that there is an essential protected liberty in being free from imprisonment.
26 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
27 Id. at 600.
28 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
29 See id. at 576.
30 Id. at 575.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Some might argue that posing a danger to oneself because one wishes to commit
suicide should not necessarily be a ground for confinement. See Derek Humphry, Final
Exit: The Practicalities of Self-Deliverance and Assisted Suicide for the Dying 17 (1991)
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O'Connor, "[t]hat a wholly sane and innocent person has a constitu-
tional right not to be physically confined by the State when his free-
dom will pose a danger neither to himself nor to others cannot be
seriously doubted."34
A powerful affirmation of the fundamentality of the right to lib-
erty from confinement emerged in Foucha v. Louisiana.35 This case
involved the institutional confinement of a man found not guilty by
reason of insanity of an aggravated burglary and an illegal discharge
of a firearm.36 The Supreme Court held that the state could not con-
tinue to confine him if he were no longer both mentally ill and danger-
ous.3 7 The Court explained that
[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary govern-
mental action. It is clear that commitment for any purpose consti-
tutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection. We have always been careful not to minimize the im-
portance and fundamental nature of the individual's right to
liberty.3 8
C. The Valid Conviction Rule
What happens to the fundamental liberty from physical confine-
ment when an "innocent" person who is neither mentally ill nor dan-
gerous performs an act that is prohibited by the criminal law?
Perhaps because of its obvious implications for the incarceration of
convicts, the Court in Foucha supplemented its praise for the funda-
mental right to liberty by stating that a "State, pursuant to its police
power, may of course imprison convicted criminals for the purposes of
deterrence and retribution." 39
(asking rhetorically, "Aren't these archaic laws [subjecting those who assist a suicide in
England to a sentence of up to 14 years imprisonment] ready to be changed to situations
befitting modem understanding and morality?"); The Hemlock Society USA, Mission
Statement ("The Hemlock Society USA believes terminally ill people should have the right
to self-determination for all end-of-life decisions.") (on file with the New York University
Law Review). This is not, however, because the state lacks a compelling interest in pro-
tecting citizens from danger. It is instead because many view suicide as itself a fundamen-
tal right. Cf. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990)
(recognizing substantive due process right to bodily integrity that includes right of compe-
tent person to refuse life-saving medical treatment).
34 O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 573 n.8; see also Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504,509 (1972)
(noting that commitment to mental hospital is "massive curtailment of liberty").
35 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
36 Id. at 1782.
37 Id. at 1786-87.
38 Id. at 1785 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
39 Id. But deterrence of and retribution for what? Citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969) and Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Foucha Court noted
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Along the same lines, in Meachum v. Fano,40 the Supreme Court
determined that the right to liberty from confinement does not survive
a criminal conviction.41 The Court restated this principle in Vitek v.
Jones.42 There the Court held that transferring a prisoner to a mental
hospital implicated a fourteenth amendment liberty interest and re-
quired procedural due process protection beyond the criminal trial it-
self.43 In defining the liberty interest retained by the prisoner, the
Court stated "[u]ndoubtedly, a valid criminal conviction and prison
sentence extinguish a defendant's right to freedom from confine-
ment."44 Such a conviction and sentence sufficiently extinguish a de-
fendant's liberty "to empower the State to confine him in any of its
prisons." 45
The Court clearly treats the fundamental right to liberty differ-
ently from all other fundamental rights. Though liberty from confine-
ment is an essential, core right of citizenship, a criminal conviction
nonetheless extinguishes that right. While a criminal conviction must
be "valid," this requirement places minimal substantive limits upon
the government. A valid conviction entails many procedural protec-
that "there are constitutional limitations on the conduct that a State may criminalize." Id.
It is strange, however, that the Court cited Brandenburg and Robinson to defend the prop-
osition that the Constitution limits the conduct for which people may constitutionally be
imprisoned. Brandenburg is a first amendment case that would have been decided the
same way even if the speech in question had been censored without any deprivation of
liberty from confinement. See New York Tunes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964)
(holding that free speech requires protection from civil as well as criminal sanctions). Sim-
ilarly, Robinson involved a conviction for a status (that of being addicted to narcotics)
rather than an act; therefore, no conduct at all was implicated. The Foucha Court was
apparently unable to find a single case holding that because liberty from confinement is a
fundamental right, there are constitutional limitations on conduct for which imprisonment
may be imposed. The Court might have cited Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S.
156 (1972), for the proposition that some unprotected activities may not be criminalized
and subjected to the penalty of incarceration. Id. at 169-70. Although the Court in
Papachrlstou purported to invalidate a vagrancy statute on vagueness grounds, id. at 162,
Professor Post has argued that in light of the Court's rhetoric about nonconformity, dis-
senters, and idlers, "[w]e can interpret [the case] .. as holding that the norms of middle-
class virtue are not a constitutionally acceptable basis for ordering the relationship be-
tween police and citizen." Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and
Social Orders, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 491, 498 (1994).
40 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
41 Id. at 224 (noting that "given a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been
constitutionally deprived of his liberty" (emphasis added)).
42 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
43 Id. at 481.
44 Id. at 493 (citing Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)).
45 Fano, 427 U.S. at 224. The Court there held that once a defendant has been "val-
idly" convicted, "the State may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison sys-
tem so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution."
Id.
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tions;46 however, the only substantive component of a "valid" convic-
tion is that the criminal conduct not be constitutionally protected as a
fundamental right.47 Thus, for example, a person cannot be deprived
of her liberty as a punishment for free speech,48 association,49 or the
46 See text accompanying notes 130-46 infra.
47 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,454-55 (1972) (invalidating criminal pro-
hibition against distribution of contraceptives to unmarried couples); Griswold v. Connect-
icut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (invalidating criminal prohibition against use of
contraceptives by married couples). Of course, even those laws criminalizing conduct that
is not a fundamental right must be rationally related to a legitimate state objective. See,
e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Co., 348 U.S. 483,487-88 (1955) (upholding law restricting
optometrists' privileges as rationally related to health); United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (holding that laws would be sustained if known or reasonably
inferable facts afforded support for legislation); see also Robert W. Bennett, "Mere" Ra-
tionality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 Calif. L. Rev.
1049, 1049 (1979) (noting that "Supreme Court has long insisted, as a matter of constitu-
tional doctrine, that legislative action must be rationally related to the accomplishment of
some legitimate state purpose"); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L.
Rev. 197, 199 (1976) (discussing "judicial formula that a law is invalid by virtue of the fifth
or the fourteenth amendment unless it is a rational means toward some intended legislative
end"). For an example of the application of the rational basis test in the equal protection
context, see City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 US. 297, 303 (1976) (holding that to be
constitutionally permissible, classification must be "rationally related to a legitimate state
interest").
Since courts, for the most part, presume that state legislatures act within the bounds of
the Constitution, a statute will not be invalidated if any justification can reasonably be
found. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963) (upholding law limiting the
practice of debt-adjustment to licensed attorneys after nominal rational basis scrutiny and
stating that questions of utility of such legislation "are properly addressed to the legisla-
ture, not to us"). Professor Tribe has observed that "[d]espite its venerable origins, the
requirement that legislation be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose or a
recognizable community value can serve as little more than a source of pressure on govern-
ment to articulate purposes that fit a challenged law," given the courts' refusal to inquire
into actual (rather than conceivable) legislative purpose and the context in which the law
exists. L. Tribe, supra note 13, § 15-2, at 1306. But see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (finding legislation distinguishing mentally retarded
from other citizens violated equal protection clause because not rationally related to legiti-
mate state interest). For a more thorough discussion of rational basis review and its appli-
cation, see Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev.
1689, 1713 (1984) (arguing that "[a]lthough the rationality test is highly deferential, its
function is to ensure that classifications rest on something other than a naked preference
for one person or group over another").
48 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,277 (1964) (holding that tort
of defamation is subject to first amendment constraints and stating that "[w]hat a State
may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the
reach of its civil law"); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 327 (1957) (overturning crimi-
nal convictions of members of Communist Party for speech too remote to constitute
incitement).
49 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963) (invalidating state law as
applied that banned improper solicitation of legal business as violative of freedom of asso-
ciation); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,466 (1958) (protecting freedom to associate as
fourteenth amendment right).
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refusal to answer a question that might incriminate her.50 This sub-
stantive validity requirement is no different, however, from that im-
posed upon a zoning ordinance or a licensing system, either of which
also must be "rational" and must withstand strict constitutional scru-
tiny if it burdens additional fundamental rights.51 This means that
there is no substantive burden of justification that the government
must bear by virtue of its decision to regulate conduct through incar-
ceration, even though that decision deprives a citizen of a fundamen-
tal right.52
By way of example, consider the case of a hypothetical defen-
dant, John Doe, who is charged with the crime of eating a hashish
brownie in the state of Ames. The state's investigation of the crime
conforms in all respects with the dictates of the fourth and fifth
amendments. The state provides Doe with an excellent attorney.
Doe's criminal trial is entirely fair, and the admissible evidence of
Doe's guilt is overwhelming. The jury finds Doe guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, Doe is sentenced to the statutory minimum of five
years in prison, and his conviction is sustained on appeal. At no point
must the state prove that it has a compelling interest in stopping peo-
ple from eating hashish.5 3
If eating hashish were itself a fundamental right, then Doe could
demand that the state prove as part of its case that the statute under
which he was prosecuted passes strict scrutiny.5 By confining Doe for
his ingestion of hashish, however, the state does not merely burden
Doe's putative right to eat hashish; it burdens his right to be free from
50 See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,453 (1972) (holding that protection
afforded by grant of immunity for self-incriminating statements should be coextensive with
protection afforded by privilege against compulsory self-incrimination).
51 See note 47 supra.
52 There may be eighth amendment limits upon the length of incarceration for a given
offense, but recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that such limits are minimal at best.
See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95 (1991) (finding that sentence of life in
prison without possibility of parole for sale of 650 grams of cocaine did not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment, despite defendant's status as first-time felon).
53 Where there is no compelling interest in preventing the conduct, there is also no
compelling interest in punishing it. To the extent that conduct is serious and harmful
enough to give rise to a compelling interest in retribution (an interest independent of
whether the punishment will deter further wrongdoing), there is also necessarily a compel-
ling interest in preventing the conduct in the first place. For further discussion of the rela-
tionship between the respective interests in prevention and retribution, see text
accompanying notes 224-26 infra.
54 See note 15 and accompanying text supra. One commentator has argued that height-
ened scrutiny of legislation criminalizing drug use might be required under the ninth
amendment. See Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 Cornell L.
Rev. 1, 35 (1988) (proposing that "the Ninth Amendment can be viewed as establishing a
general constitutional presumption in favor of individual liberty").
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confinement. The state may nevertheless deprive him of his liberty
from incarceration without substantive justification as long as there is
no right to engage in the prohibited conduct. Governments may, in
other words, place behind bars those who engage in trivial, non-
threatening activity, provided the activity is prohibited by the criminal
law and does not qualify as a fundamental right.55
As Part I demonstrates, courts should recognize that incarcera-
tion deprives an individual of a fundamental right. Part II addresses
the argument that notice provides an adequate basis for deprivation of
this fundamental right.
II
NoTICE
If courts begin to recognize the fundamental right to be free from
incarceration and treat it like other fundamental rights, the issue of
the effect of notice on the analysis arises. All citizens are put on no-
tice by the criminal law that engaging in particular conduct subjects
them to incarceration. As this Part will demonstrate, however, notice
55 The state must also prove that the statute passes "rational basis" scrutiny, but this
burden is not very demanding in practice. See note 47 supra. The Court's treatment of
liberty, while peculiar, is mirrored in its approach to the death penalty. Just as the state
does not have to justify incarceration of "validly convicted" individuals, it does not need to
defend imposition of the death penalty. The Supreme Court has, of course, held that death
may be "cruel and unusual punishment" under yarious circumstances. See, e.g., Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (holding that death penalty statutes violate eighth amend-
ment unless they permit jurors to give effect to mitigating evidence); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (holding that execution of rapists violates eighth amendment);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J. concurring) (arguing that giving
jurors too much discretion in capital sentencing violates eighth amendment because it re-
sults in arbitrary imposition of death penalty); see also Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127,
1130 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (indicating his view that
no sentence of death may be constitutionally imposed under current death penalty
scheme). However, the Court has also indicated there need not be a close fit between
prevention of murder and the imposition of the death penalty. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 186-87 (1976) (plurality opinion). In other words, though there is undisputedly a
compelling interest in preventing murder, governments may execute murderers without
showing either that execution actually prevents murder or that there are no less restrictive
means of prevention.
One might argue that because murder is such a heinous crime, there is a compelling
interest not only in preventing but also in punishing murder in the most severe manner
possible. The Supreme Court has not, however, relied on the compelling nature of retribu-
tion-or any other compelling interest argument-to defend capital punishment, but has
instead rested primarily on the assumption that if the imposition of death is not dispropor-
tionate in relation to the crime of conviction, then the government has fully satisfied its
substantive burden of justification. Id. at 187. The right to life, like the right to liberty
from confinement, is undoubtedly a fundamental right. Yet, as with the right to liberty
from confinement, deprivations of the right to life have not been subjected to strict scru-
tiny. The Court has, for some reason, seen fit to treat criminal penalties as sui generis.
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alone provides an inadequate justification for deprivations of the fun-
damental right to liberty.
A. The Notice Distinction
There is one significant distinction between governmental bur-
dens upon most fundamental rights, and upon the right to be free
from physical confinement. The individual who wishes to enjoy her
liberty from confinement generally can do so simply by obeying the
criminal law. She is entitled to notice of what acts are permissible and
impermissible,5 6 and once she takes advantage of that notice,57 she
must only refrain from violating its dictates to stay out of prison. She
may, in other words, continue to enjoy all of her fundamental rights as
long as she complies with the law.
In the case of most infringements upon fundamental rights, by
contrast, the state does not provide notice and an opportunity to avoid
the burden altogether. The state typically burdens liberties directly,
by prohibiting their exercise, rather than indirectly, by requiring that
individuals do something or refrain from doing something in order to
preserve them.58 For example, the government might prohibit interra-
cial marriage directly but would be unlikely to legislate that an indi-
vidual forfeits her right to marry interracially if she ingests hashish.59
That is, of course, the way in which deprivations of liberty from con-
finement typically do work: the law requires that we refrain from vio-
56 The Court has consistently required states to provide notice of prohibited conduct
subject to criminal penalties, as well as notice of what those penalties are. See, e.g., Miller
v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429 (1987) (explaining constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto laws); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1982) (finding criminal statute which
failed to define relevant terms void for vagueness under due process clause); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976) (explaining due process requirement that defendants be on
notice that conduct violates criminal law).
57 She may take advantage of notice by educating herself on the content of the criminal
law. Whether she undergoes this process of education or not, she will be presumed to
know what is and what is not a crime. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Taylor, 113 S. Ct. 2112, 2127
(1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating general presumption that citizens know the law);
Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 (1985) (noting that citizens are presumed to know the
law).
58 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (West 1963) (contraceptive sale
prohibition), invalidated by Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965); Mass. Gen.
L. Ann., ch. 272 § 21 (West 1966) (permitting married persons to obtain contraceptives but
prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to single persons), invalidated by Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438,440 (1972); Tex. Penal Code §§ 1191-1194 (1911) (criminal prohibition
against abortion), invalidated by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,120 (1973). But see Wis. Stat.
§ 245.10(1), (4), (5) (1973) (prohibiting marriage without court approval by men owing
child support), invalidated by Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 377 (1978).
59 But see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2826-31 (1992) (invalidating
husband-notification provision of Pennsylvania abortion law that made exercise of right to
abortion contingent upon signed statement from woman that she notified her spouse).
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lating its dictates in order to avoid losing our liberty from
confinement.
Accordingly, if an individual were deprived directly and without
notice of her liberty from confinement, she would have cause to com-
plain that the state had unconstitutionally taken away her fundamen-
tal right to liberty. To find herself incarcerated, an individual must
have either presented a danger to society6° or performed or been re-
sponsible for the performance of some act or omission prohibited by
the government through its criminal law. Deprivations of the right to
liberty from confinement, then, may be imposed without substantive
justification only when they are imposed indirectly.
B. Notice as an Inadequate Explanation
The provision of notice certainly enhances the procedural fairness
of incarcerating those who violate criminal statutes. It does not, how-
ever, eliminate concerns about depriving an individual of a fundamen-
tal right when that deprivation is not necessary to serve a compelling
governmental interest. Notice and the alternative of compliance do
not fully satisfy the government's obligation to respect fundamental
rights.
The insufficiency of notice as a basis for the extinction of an
otherwise fundamental right is evident when we consider the right to
procreate. The first major case in which the Supreme Court recog-
nized this right as fundamental was Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Wil-
liamson.61 The case involved an Oklahoma statute providing for the
sterilization of a specified class of recidivist criminals. The question at
issue was whether, consistent with the United States Constitution,
some types of criminals could be subjected to sterilization while others
60 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,427 (1979) (requiring state, in context of civil
commitment, to demonstrate that individual to be confined is mentally ill and dangerous);
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (implying that dangerous individuals
may be confined in holding that nondangerous individuals may not). For commitment
standards in a related context, see Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1784 (1992) (hold-
ing that individual found not guilty by reason of insanity "may be held as long as he is both
mentally ill and dangerous, but no longer"); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364
(1983) (allowing state to confine, subject to statutorily prescribed review, defendant found
not guilty by reason of insanity); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) (explain-
ing that "'[liberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action"' (quoting
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part))); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that person
found incompetent to stand trial cannot be committed indefinitely solely on the basis of
incompetency).
61 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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were spared this penalty.62 Had the case involved the imposition of a
prison sentence for one but not for the other of two similar offenses,
there is little question that the Court would have approved the dispar-
ity as rationally related to a legitimate state interest. However, recog-
nizing that the fundamental right to procreate was involved,63 the
Court applied strict scrutiny.64 The Court in Skinner ultimately struck
down the statute at issue, on the ground that Oklahoma lacked a com-
pelling interest to which the disparate imposition of sterilization upon
criminals like Skinner was narrowly tailored.65 Though Skinner was a
criminal, on notice that his prohibited conduct could be punished with
sterilization, subject to the valid conviction rule, this fact played no
role in the Court's analysis of infringements upon Skinner's right to
procreate.
Consider another example in the area of procreation. While the
issue has not gone to the Supreme Court, lower courts and commenta-
tors have addressed the legality of requiring women convicted of crim-
inal child abuse to undergo a Norplant implant as an alternative to
incarceration.66 At the center of this discussion is the assumption that
62 Id. at 536. The statute involved was Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act,
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57 §§ 171-195 (West 1935). The Act allowed a "habitual criminal" to
be "rendered sexually sterile without detriment to his or her general health." Skinner, 316
U.S. at 537. The Court found that because a provision of the Act "immunized" offenses
arising from prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses, the law
discriminated in burdening the fundamental right to procreate. Id. at 541. The Court then
applied strict scrutiny and struck down the law, concluding that the legislature lacked a
compelling reason for this disparate treatment. Id. at 541-42.
63 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. The Court found the legislation in question to involve "one
of the basic civil rights of man." Id. It explained that both "[m]arriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." Id.
64 Although the outcome of the case turned on an equal protection rationale, strict
scrutiny was applied only because of the inequality in the deprivation of a fundamental
right. Id. The Court stated that "[w]hen the law lays an unequal hand on those who have
committed intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the other, it
has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality
for oppressive treatment." Id. (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886);
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938)). Later cases also cited Skinner as the source for
the classification of the right to procreate as a fundamental right. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965) (White, J.,
concurring in judgment).
65 Skinner, 361 U.S. at 541-42.
66 See, e.g., Madeline Henley, The Creation and Perpetuation of the Mother/Body
Myth: Judicial and Legislative Enlistment of Norplant, 41 Buff. L. Rev. 703, 707-08 (1993)
(discussing how myths about women's reproductive role in society are used to justify Nor-
plant as criminal sentence); Steven S. Spitz, The Norplant Debate: Birth Control or
Woman Control, 25 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 131, 131 (1993) (arguing that states,
"[u]nder the guise of the health and welfare functions of a state's police power,. . . utilized
Norplant to limit a woman's ability to reproduce"); Kristyn M. Walker, Judicial Control of
Reproductive Freedom: The Use of Norplant as a Condition of Probation, 78 Iowa L. Rev.
779, 780 (1993) (asserting that "Norplant is unreasonable condition of probation [because]
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because the right to procreate is fundamental, the deprivation of that
right (in the form of enforced birth control) may be incompatible with
the Constitution, absent narrow tailoring to a compelling state inter-
est.67 Many understand this to be the case in spite of the fact that the
women subject to the deprivation could have avoided their predica-
ment by following the dictates of the criminal law, of which they were
on notice.68
We see from these cases that courts continue to protect an indi-
vidual's right to procreate even when the individual could have pre-
served her rights by conforming her conduct to the law. This faithful
protection of fundamental fights undermines the argument that the
notice feature of the criminal law justifies the Court's readiness to per-
... the state's compelling interest in rehabilitation and protection of the public does not
outweigh the probationer's fundamental rights"); William Booth, Judge Orders Birth Con-
trol Implant in Defendant, Wash. Post, Jan. 5, 1991, at Al (reporting judge's order of Nor-
plant as condition of probation after defendant pleaded guilty to child abuse).
67 See, e.g., Note, The Constitutionality of the Use of the Norplant Contraceptive De-
vice as a Condition of Probation, 20 Hastings Const. L.Q. 207, 222-24 (1992) (invoking
fundamental rights of procreation and of bodily integrity to argue that Norplant probation
condition is unconstitutional).
68 See, e.g., People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290,293-94 (Ct. App. 1967) (invalidat-
ing condition prohibiting pregnancy outside marriage as lacking reasonable relation to fu-
ture criminality where crime was robbery); State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313, 315 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1989) (invalidating condition prohibiting pregnancy to woman convicted of child en-
dangerment as undue intrusion upon her right to privacy); Howland v. State, 420 So.2d 918,
919-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (invalidating condition prohibiting child abuser from fa-
thering child as lacking reasonable relation to crime of child abuse); Rodriguez v. State,
378 So.2d 7, 9-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (invalidating condition prohibiting pregnancy
of child abuser as lacking relation to goal of decreasing abuse and future criminality); State
v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337-38 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (invalidating condition re-
quiring woman convicted of child abuse to remain childless for five years as severe restric-
tion on her liberty only remotely related to her crime and to rehabilitative goals). Though
some of these cases use "rational relation" language in describing the standard ostensibly
being applied, their consistent invalidation of probation conditions restricting procreation
demonstrates that a higher level of scrutiny is in fact being applied. Cf. City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (finding equal protection violation
upon application of rational basis review to legislation distinguishing mentally retarded
from other citizens in application of zoning ordinance). Criminal defendants subjected to
Norplant probation conditions were not necessarily on notice at the time of their offenses
that this condition was a possibility. For example, in the case of Darlene Johnson, the
defendant was said to have engaged in the prohibited conduct before Norplant was ap-
proved by the FDA in 1990. See Mark A. Stein, Judge Stirs Debate with Ordering of Birth
Control; Courts: A Mother of Four Agrees to Have a Contraceptive Implant in Pleading
Guilty to Child Abuse, Critics Call it Unconstitutional, L.A. Times, Jan. 10, 1991, at A3. In
fact, defendant Darlene Johnson had never even heard of Norplant until the judge imposed
it as a condition of probation. See Spitz, supra note 66, at 145 (indicating judge had to
describe to defendant that Norplant condition was "like birth control pills, except you
don't have to take them every day"). None of the cases addressing the issue, however, rely
on this fact or suggest in any way that a statute providing specific notice of Norplant penal-
ties would have survived their scrutiny. See sources cited in note 66 supra.
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mit the deprivation of liberty from incarceration without applying
strict constitutional scrutiny.
Some commentators, however, nonetheless distinguish the liberty
right. Professor Kathleen Sullivan, for example, describes as "danger-
ous" "a prosecutor's offer of non-execution or non-imprisonment to a
confessed killer of her own children on condition that she submit to be
sterilized. ' 69 The implication here is that the murderer retains the
fundamental right to procreate but forfeits any interest in life or lib-
erty, by virtue, presumably, of the relevant eighth amendment juris-
prudence legalizing the death penalty and essentially eliminating
proportionality review for prison terms, respectively. This position is
untenable. It would be arbitrary to designate procreation as an in-
alienable fundamental right while liberty from confinement and life
itself are left vulnerable to undisciplined political mood. The better
view recognizes that life, liberty, and procreation are all fundamental
rights whose deprivation through the criminal process must survive
eighth amendment as well as strict substantive due process scrutiny.
A recent case involving the first amendment right to freedom of
speech similarly demonstrates the inadequacy of notice in justifying
restrictions upon fundamental rights. In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
New York State Crime Victims Board,70 the Supreme Court invali-
dated a statute requiring that income from works describing an indi-
vidual's crimes be deposited into an escrow account, to compensate
the victims and other creditors of the self-described criminal. The
New York legislature enacted the statute in question7' in reaction to
concerns that the infamous serial killer, David Berkowitz, also known
as "Son of Sam," would profit from the sale of his story while his
victims' families remained without restitution.72 Because of its ori-
69 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1415, 1485-86
(1989).
70 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
71 N.Y. Exec. Law § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991). For a discussion of the
terms and provisions of the statute, see notes 74-77 and accompanying text infra. The
statute states:
Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other legal entity con-
tracting with any person or the representative or assignee of any person, accused or
convicted of a crime in this state, with respect to the reenactment of such crime, by
way of a movie, book, magazine article, tape recording, phonograph record, radio or
television presentation, live entertainment of any kind, or from the expression of
such accused or convicted person's thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regard-
ing such crime, shall submit a copy of such contract to the board and pay over to the
board any moneys which would otherwise, by terms of such contract, be owing to the
person so accused or convicted or his representatives.
N.Y. Exec. Law § 632-a(1).
72 See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 108 (citing N.Y. Exec. Law § 632-a).
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gins, the New York statute came to be known as the "Son of Sam"
law.73
The Son of Sam law74 required entities contracting with accused
or convicted criminals for descriptions of their crimes to provide the
Crime Victims Board with a copy of the contract.75 Any income
earned by the accused or convicted criminal under that contract also
had to be paid to the Crime Victims Board and put in escrow for the
victims of the crime.76 Victims could recover damages against the
criminal for up to five years after the money was put in escrow. 77
The case that ultimately reached the Supreme Court arose out of
a contract between Simon & Schuster and Henry Hill, who admitted
his crimes in a book authored by Nicholas Pileggi.78 When the Crime
Victims Board came to learn of and examine the book, the Board or-
dered Simon & Schuster to turn over all money it owed to Henry
Hill.79 Simon & Schuster subsequently brought suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunction barring the en-
forcement of the Son of Sam law.80 When the case reached the
Supreme Court, two lower federal courts had found the statute to be
consistent with the first amendment.81
The Supreme Court applied strict constitutional scrutiny to the
Son of Sam Law,8 because "[a] statute is presumptively inconsistent
with the First Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers
because of the content of their speech."a The Court reasoned that
the Son of Sam law imposed such a burden by singling out expression
73 Id.
74 The Son of Sam law was amended by the New York legislature before it came under
the Supreme Court's scrutiny. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 632-a (McKinney Supp. 1991). The
amended section created priorities for claims against the account, including subrogation
claims of the state for payment to the victims, civil judgments obtained by victims, and
taxes due to state and local authorities. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 110 (citing N.Y.
Exec. Law § 632-a(11).
75 Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 109 (citing N.Y. Exec. Law § 632-a(1)).
76 Id.
77 Id. Funds would also be released for providing legal representation for the accused
or convicted criminal, see N.Y. Exec. Law § 632-a(8), for the necessary expenses of pro-
ducing the moneys paid into the account, for subrogation claims of the state for payments
to crime victims, and for claims for creditors of the criminal other than the victims. Simon
& Schuster, 502 U.S. at 110.
78 See Nicholas Pileggi, Wiseguy: Life in a Mafia Family (1985).
79 Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 114-15.
80 Id. at 115.
81 Id. (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 724 F. Supp. 170, 178-79 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (upholding statute); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 782-84 (2d Cir.
1990) (affirming district court)).
82 See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 118.
83 Id. at 115 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991)).
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for a financial penalty and by targeting that expression based upon its
content.84 The Court reasoned:
[w]hether the First Amendment "speaker" is considered to be
Henry Hill, whose income the statute places in escrow because of
the story he has told, or Simon & Schuster, which can publish books
about crime with the assistance of only those criminals willing to
forgo remuneration for at least five years, the statute plainly im-
poses a financial disincentive only on speech of a particular
content.85
After applying strict scrutiny, the Court invalidated the statute,
finding it overinclusive.86 In the state's effort to address its admittedly
compelling interest "in ensuring that victims of crime are compen-
sated by those who harm them" and "in ensuring that criminals do not
profit from their crimes,"87 it designed a statute that applied in cases
not implicating those interests.&s The Court concluded that regula-
tions must be "'narrowly tailored' to advance the interest asserted by
the State," and "[a] regulation is not 'narrowly tailored'... where, as
here, 'a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to
advance [the State's content-neutral] goals." 89
84 Id. at 116. The Court indicated that regardless of who the first amendment speaker
is, the statute clearly exacts a financial penalty which serves as a disincentive to speak. Id.
85 Id. The Court might have rested its decision on a narrower ground by finding the
statute's presumptively impermissible burden to be imposed upon the noncriminal pub-
lisher rather than upon the criminal. In this way, the Court could have left for another day
the question of whether a criminal has cause to complain about a forfeiture that results
from the violation of a criminal statute, a forfeiture that could have been avoided simply by
obeying an already-existing criminal law. Many of Henry Hill's crimes pre-dated passage
of the Son of Sam law. Id. at 112. Though one might distinguish notice that conduct is
criminal from notice of royalty forfeiture, the Court did not rely on the fact that Henry Hill
was only on notice that he might be subject to criminal penalties but not to the potential
loss of royalties in determining either that strict scrutiny applied or that the Son of Sam law
violated the Constitution. Id. at 115-16.
86 Id. at 121. The Court indicated that the statute, as written, applied to works on any
subject that expressed the thoughts of accused or convicted persons about their crimes,
even tangentially. Additionally, the Court found that the statute defined the phrase "per-
son convicted of a crime" so broadly that it extended to authors who merely admitted in
their books that they had committed a crime even if never actually convicted or even ac-
cused. Id.
87 Id. at 118.
88 Id. at 121.
89 Id. at 122 n.* (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,799 (1989) (sec-
ond alteration in original)). Just as the Supreme Court did not rely on the innocence of
Simon & Schuster for its conclusion that strict scrutiny ought to apply, it similarly did not
rely upon the fact that individuals not actually convicted of any crime would be subject to
the law. In discussing the statute's breadth, after determining that strict scrutiny was the
appropriate standard of review, the Court noted that the statute's "broad definition of
'person convicted of a crime,"' included people never even accused of any criminal con-
duct. 502 U.S. at 121. Even here, however, the Court's concern was not that presump-
tively innocent individuals, entitled to retain their fundamental rights, would suffer from
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In the area of first amendment freedom of speech, then, we see
that the Court applies the same strict scrutiny to impositions on
criminals' freedom as it applies to impositions upon the innocent.90
Though Henry Hill freely admitted his guilt in the commission of nu-
merous felonies, and though he was on notice that his behavior vio-
lated the criminal law and could subject him to imprisonment, the
Court protected his freedom of speech nonetheless. Simon &
Schuster, like the procreation cases, rests on the premise that an indi-
vidual's fundamental rights may not be compromised unless that com-
promise is necessary to serve a compelling state interest, even when
she has received notice that her conduct was illegal.
One might wonder at this point whether perhaps the doctrines of
Skinner, the Norplant cases, and Simon & Schuster are misconceived.
Perhaps they, and not the valid conviction rule, should be adjusted.
They do not, however, represent an unusual approach in our legal sys-
tem. Many rights rest on the premise that taking a known risk does
not automatically constitute a waiver. One example is the right to
abortion. Although the Court has never suggested that minors have a
right to engage in consensual sexual intercourse,91 it nonetheless holds
the statute along with the guilty. Its discussion of the breadth of the statute was limited to
supporting the contention that the statute was indeed overinclusive, that it extended fur-
ther than necessary to serve its compelling putative purpose. Id. at 123. The Court stated,
for example, that the law "reaches a wide range of literature that does not enable a crimi-
nal to profit from his crime while a victim remains uncompensated." Id. at 122.
90 If the criminal is already in prison, however, prison security needs justify lesser scru-
tiny of all rights deprivations. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987)
(limiting scrutiny of alleged first amendment free exercise clause violations in prison to
determination of whether challenged restriction is "reasonably related to legitimate peno-
logical objectives"); 'Thrner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91 (1987) (same); Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 522 (1979) (upholding rule prohibiting inmates from receiving hardcover books,
unless mailed directly from publishers, book clubs, or bookstores, for security reasons);
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (holding
that "[iln a prison context, an inmate does not retain those First Amendment Rights that
are 'inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives
of the corrections system"') (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). These
cases demonstrate that once an individual is convicted of a crime and taken into custody,
her constitutional rights are severely curtailed in the interests of prison security. In other
words, the fact of imprisonment itself justifies limits on the exercise of other constitutional
rights that would excessively burden the government as custodian. See, e.g., Wolff v. Mc-
Donnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) ("[T]he fact that prisoners retain rights under the Due
Process Clause in no way implies that these rights are not subject to restrictions imposed
by the nature of the regime to which they have been lawfully committed."). Absent some
nexus to prison, however, a criminal actor retains the same first amendment protection
enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.
91 Indeed, the Court has strongly indicated the contrary. See Michael M. v. Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 464, 467 (1981) (upholding even an unequal statutory rape law).
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that a minor's right to choose abortion is protected.2 One might ar-
gue that engaging in sexual intercourse, knowing that it might lead to
pregnancy, constitutes a waiver of the right not to procreate, just as
knowingly violating the criminal law is currently held to waive the
right to freedom from confinement. This argument has been rejected,
however, in favor of the view that even people on notice of the conse-
quences of their actions are entitled to a searching review of whether
it is constitutionally appropriate to permit those consequences to fol-
low. As we will see,93 the existence of the eighth amendment ban on
cruel and unusual punishment similarly supports the view that violat-
ing the law does not waive the right to have the consequences of that
violation substantively scrutinized.
I
EXPLAINING THE COURT'S CONFUSION
As we have seen, notice does not provide a workable distinction
between the fundamental right to liberty, which is subject to the "valid
conviction rule," and other fundamental rights, which survive valid
convictions. Yet there remains a strong intuitive appeal to the argu-
ment that prison is somehow different. This Part considers three po-
tential explanations for the Supreme Court's failure to provide the
same safeguards for liberty as it does for other fundamental rights.
A. A False Equation
In part, the Court's unwillingness to question incarceration that
results from a valid conviction follows from an implicit equation be-
tween the following two propositions: "you cannot do X" and "you
will go to prison if you do X." The import of this equation is that if
the government may prevent an activity,94 because there is no funda-
mental right to engage in that activity, then the government may elect
instead to deprive people of their liberty from incarceration as a pen-
alty for engaging in the activity.
Consider the following illustration of this equation. Assume that
a federal statute prohibits possession of a certain fruit-the
megafruit-anywhere in the United States. Rather than punishing vi-
92 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (recognizing that "right to personal pri-
vacy includes the abortion decision"); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74
(1976) (striking down law that did not allow for judicial bypass); Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2832 (1992) (continuing to acknowledge that parental consent re-
quirements must allow for judicial bypass).
93 See notes 94-128 and accompanying text infra (discussing the false equation).
94 The government might prevent an activity by failing to provide authorization, zon-
ing, or building permits, for example.
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olators, however, the statute's enforcement mechanism simply em-
ploys a megafruit interdiction policy at the border.95 If government
agents confiscated all megafruit coming into this country at the border
as contraband, it might be possible to deny all United States citizens
access to megafruit. If an individual believed that she had a right to
possess and enjoy megafruit, she could bring a due process challenge
to the interdiction policy, on the ground that it impermissibly burdens
her substantive right to have megafruit. If the Supreme Court heard
such a case and decided it in favor of the government, the only liberty
lost would be the liberty to possess megafruit, perhaps justified under
rational basis scrutiny on the ground that it carries some health risk.
Alternatively, suppose that a statute provides that instead of con-
fiscating the fruit, the government may imprison any individual caught
with the forbidden fruit. Under the Court's precedents, this scenario
would be indistinguishable from the confiscation case. In either situa-
tion, an individual's interest in the megafruit is burdened. If there is a
fundamental right to have megafruit, then that burden must be nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. If there is
not such a fundamental right, then the threat of imprisonment is bur-
densome only to those who intend to thwart the government's policy,
and if the policy is rational, the burden is tolerable.
The above equation might be sound if the threat of imprison-
ment, like the hypothetical interdiction policy, effectively eliminated
the possibility of violation-that is, if the deterrent effect of the crimi-
nal statute were 100%. One might say, under such circumstances, that
either interdiction at the border or the threat of imprisonment effec-
tively makes the megafruit unavailable to people in the United
States.96 A major difficulty with this equation appears, however,
when an individual does violate the criminal statute and is conse-
quently incarcerated. The equation fails at this point because impris-
onment of megafruit possessors inflicts a greater hardship on the
possessor than would the act of withholding the fruit. Just as an
armed robber who kills an uncooperative victim cannot seriously
maintain that what he did was the equivalent of stealing the victim's
money, the government that incarcerates an uncooperative,
95 For purposes of this hypothetical case, assume that the megafruit cannot be grown in
the United States.
96 Even 100% deterrence would not, of course, eliminate the burden of the threat of
incarceration from citizens' lives. As an illustration of this burden, consider the important
difference between having one's money stolen by a pickpocket and having one's money
demanded at gunpoint. The potential for imprisonment (or death), even if never realized,
is daunting in its own right. Therefore, even if 100% deterrence could be achieved with the
threat of imprisonment, the cost of such a threat would still arguably be greater than the
mere inability to enjoy the megafruit.
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megafruit-possessing citizen must acknowledge that it has done more
than simply make megafruit unavailable to that citizen.
In contrast, then, to the usual concern in fundamental rights anal-
ysis that the law will "work" and will thereby burden the exercise of
rights just as it was intended to do, the concern when protecting lib-
erty from confinement arises most prominently when the law does not
"work"-that is, when individuals violate the law and thereby become
subject to the deprivation of their liberty. In the latter case, the con-
duct targeted by the law need not be protected in order for the law to
raise constitutional problems.97
The Court often fails to concern itself with this distinction, how-
ever, when evaluating criminal statutes that impose incarceration as a
penalty. Consider Bowers v. Hardwick,98 a case in which the Court
found no underlying fundamental right to the conduct of the accused
criminal. In Hardwick, the Supreme Court considered whether a stat-
ute criminalizing sodomy and providing a sentence of up to twenty
years imprisonment for violators was unconstitutional as applied to
homosexuals. The Court held that the fundamental right of privacy in
matters of procreation99 did not extend to consensual sexual relations
97 One might describe this distinction as one between the means and the ends of the
criminal legislation in question. The ends-preventing people from engaging in unpro-
tected activity-may be constitutionally beyond reproach. However, the means employed
in doing so-imprisonment of those who disobey the prohibition-raises serious constitu-
tional questions.
In the area of ninth amendment rights, Professor Barnett has described the relation-
ship between governmental powers and individual rights as a "power-constraint" relation-
ship, in which the enumeration of individual rights (as well as the existence of
unenumerated rights recognized by the ninth amendment) circumscribes the means by
which the federal government may fulfill ends that are otherwise legitimate by virtue of its
constitutionally enumerated powers. See Barnett, supra note 54, at 11-16. According to
Barnett, "[t]he Supreme Court appears to have adopted a means-constraints approach
when enumerated rights are at issue." Id. at 12. Within this paradigm, the means/ends
dichotomy may suggest that because liberty from confinement is a fundamental right, the
federal government's power to regulate interstate commerce in megafruit may not (without
compelling reasons) be achieved through imprisonment of those who possess the fruit,
even though regulating megafruit does not itself collide with any fundamental right (e.g., to
possess megafruit). The fourteenth and fifth amendment right to liberty from confinement
accordingly constrains the means by which the government may pursue an otherwise allow-
able end that does not inherently implicate a fundamental right.
98 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
99 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that abortion decision is
included in right to privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that
state law violated equal protection clause by providing dissimilar treatment of right of pri-
vacy for married and unmarried persons); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86
(1965) (striking down state statute forbidding use of contraceptives as unnecessarily broad
and violative of "zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guaran-
tees"); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-43 (1942) (holding that
state law authorizing forced sterilization deprives individual of "basic liberty" and violates
equal protection clause).
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between individuals of the same sex.10o Hence the conduct at issue in
the case was not thought to constitute a fundamental right.10
Having denied the existence of a fundamental right, the Court did
not even evaluate whether incarceration, as provided by the statute,
served some compelling interest in preventing or punishing sodomy.
Instead, the majority applied rational basis scrutiny, stating explicitly
that "[t]his case does not require a judgment on whether laws against
sodomy between consenting adults in general, or between homosexu-
als in particular, are wise or desirable."' 02 In other words, the Court
allowed that incarceration of people who engage in homosexual sod-
omy might or might not promote any worthwhile (much less compel-
ling) interest, but permitted such incarceration nonetheless. Thus,
while the burdening of a criminal's freedom of speech through con-
tent-based regulation must survive the most exacting scrutiny, 0 3 the
absolute deprivation of liberty involved in incarceration need not do
so. The Hardwick Court's only concern was the burden upon the indi-
vidual's interest in engaging in homosexual sodomy.
The Court failed to recognize that the Georgia sodomy law at
issue in Hardwick burdened more than just the acts it prohibited. Un-
like, for example, a zoning law prohibiting cohabitation by unrelated
adults of the same gender or a regulation that only licenses "straight"
bars, the Georgia provision also burdened an individual's freedom
from confinement, by allowing the imprisonment of anyone who com-
mitted an act of sodomy. Such confinement adds an additional bur-
den to the substantive prohibition of the specified conduct."o4
Confinement for engaging in conduct differs from merely making that
conduct unavailable.
Although Justice Powell joined the opinion of the Court in Hard-
wick, he wrote a concurring opinion in which he expressed discomfort
with the equation between declaring that sodomy is not a fundamental
right, on the one hand, and permitting imprisonment of individuals
100 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
101 Id. at 191.
102 Id. at 190.
103 See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 108
(1991).
104 Of course, there are convincing arguments that Hardwick is radically inconsistent
with the Court's prior precedents and that its holding regarding homosexual sodomy is
seriously flawed. See L. Tribe, supra note 13, § 15-21, at 1427-28 (discussing Court's error
in Hardwick); Laurence H. Tibe & Michael C. Doff, Levels of Generality in the Definition
of Rights, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1057, 1065-68 (1990) (arguing that Court defined right at issue
very specifically, thereby disconnecting it from existing rights). My discussion of this case
is not intended to suggest otherwise, but rather to consider the separate constitutional
burden of imprisonment.
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who engage in acts of sodomy, on the other.105 He began by stating,
"I agree with the Court that there is no fundamental ight-i.e., no
substantive right under the due process clause-such as that claimed
by respondent Hardwick, and found to exist by the Court of Ap-
peals."106 Powell hastened to add, however, that "[t]his is not to sug-
gest . . . that respondent may not be protected by the Eighth
Amendment of the Constitution."' 0 7 The Georgia law did not, in
other words, merely prohibit sodomy; it punished sodomy with impris-
onment. "In my view," Justice Powell continued, "a prison sentence
for such conduct-certainly a sentence of long duration-would cre-
ate a serious Eighth Amendment issue." 1 8 He pointed out that
"[u]nder the Georgia statute a single act of sodomy, even in the pri-
vate setting of a home, is a felony comparable in terms of the possible
sentence imposed to serious felonies such as aggravated battery, first-
degree arson, and robbery."1 9
Professor John Jeffries, a former law clerk to Justice Powell, de-
scribed Powell's views in the following way: "Where there was no
public display, no use of force, and [no] involvement with minors,
[sodomy] was essentially harmless. Society did not have to approve
such behavior, but it could not constitutionally prosecute and im-
prison those who engaged in it."11O Jeffries quotes Powell as saying
that it would violate the eighth amendment "'to punish him criminally
(imprisonment) for conduct based on a natural sexual urge, privately
and with a consenting partner."""' Though Professor Jeffries de-
scribes this view as a moderate approach to sodomy, the approach
may say as much about Justice Powell's attitude toward prison as it
does about his views of sodomy.
If the eighth amendment, outside of the death penalty context,
will not be held to contain a proportionality principle, as recent prece-
dent suggests,1 12 the argument for a due process right to liberty from
confinement most plausibly makes sense of Justice Powell's intuitions.
Even though sodomy is not protected, in his view, liberty from con-
finement may be. Preventing and punishing private, consensual acts
of sodomy do not constitute important enough interests to justify a
105 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 197 (Powell, J., concurring).
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 197-98 (citations omitted).
110 John C. Jeffries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 519 (1994).
III Id. at 522 (quoting remarks reconstructed from Justice Powell's Conference notes).
112 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95 (1991) (holding that mandatory life
sentence without possibility of parole for cocaine possession did not violate eighth
amendment).
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deprivation (certainly not a long deprivation) of liberty from
confinement.
After his retirement, Justice Powell announced that he may have
made a mistake in voting with the majority in Hardwick.113 He quali-
fied his concession, however, by adding that the case was not very
important.114 ' One way to make sense out of this unusual announce-
ment is to understand what Justice Powell may have meant in saying
that he had made a "mistake." If he was implying that he now be-
lieves homosexual sodomy to be a fundamental right, his considering
Hardwick unimportant would be quite surprising. A decision sanc-
tioning an outright ban on constitutionally protected conduct is surely
an important one. Furthermore, the holding in Hardwick provided
powerful support for the general proposition that governmental dis-
crimination against gay and lesbian Americans is constitutionally
permissible." 5
Justice Powell might still believe, however, as he did when he
wrote his concurring opinion, that homosexual sodomy is not a funda-
mental right and that banning this conduct is therefore acceptable. 16
He may also still believe, as he suggested in his opinion in Hardwick,
that sodomy is not the kind of conduct that may be constitutionally
subject to imprisonment. At the time of the decision, he voted with
the majority because the issue of imprisonment had not been raised,
and Hardwick himself had not even been prosecuted or convicted of
the crime.117 Justice Powell's change of heart may represent his cur-
rent position that a criminal law providing imprisonment for conduct
not constitutionally subject to imprisonment ought to be invalidated in
113 Ruth Marcus, Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy Law, Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1990, at A3
(reporting that Powell told group of New York University law students, "I think I probably
made a mistake in that one").
114 Id. (reporting Powell's statement that "[s]o far as I'm concerned it's just a part of my
past and not very important .... I don't suppose I've devoted half an hour" to contem-
plating the decision after it came down from the Court).
115 See L. Tribe, supra note 13, § 16-33, at 1616 n.47 (noting that Hardwick's holding
"indicates how unlikely it is that homosexuality will be deemed quasi-suspect in the near
future"). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on
the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1161,
1166 (1988) (arguing that Supreme Court's rejection of homosexual sodomy as fundamen-
tal right under due process clause in Hardwick does not foreclose recognition of sexual
orientation as constituting suspect classification for equal protection purposes).
116 Justice Powell told a reporter that the decision in Hardwick was "inconsistent in a
general way with Roe" and that "the dissent had the better of the arguments," suggesting
that he now accepts sodomy to be a fundamental right under the due process clause. See J.
Jeffries, supra note 110, at 530 (citing Anand Agneshwar, Ex-Justice Says He May Have
Been Wrong, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 3). However, his assertion that the case was unim-
portant is incompatible with a view that the conduct is protected as a fundamental right.
117 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 198 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
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a declaratory judgment action. In other words, he may believe now
that the view articulated in his concurring opinion should have led him
to vote in favor of the respondent. Under this reading, however, the
case may not be an important one because Hardwick was never incar-
cerated (beyond one night in jail) for his act of sodomy. If the rele-
vant unconstitutional deprivation were liberty from confinement
rather than sodomy, the distinction between the correct and the incor-
rect outcomes in Hardwick would be largely advisory.
What Justice Powell rejected and apparently continues to reject,
then, is the equation between the legitimacy of prohibiting conduct
and the legitimacy of penalizing that conduct through imprisonment
once it occurs, an equation implicit in the Court's general failure to
subject prison sentences to strict scrutiny. Moreover, the Court itself
has similarly rejected this equation in the death penalty context. It
has held that to impose the death penalty on an individual for the
crime of rape or for the crime of felony murder-absent a showing
that the felon behaved recklessly with respect to the possibility of
death-would violate the eighth amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishments 11 8 These determinations did not
amount to a finding that the death penalty was overly burdensome to
the "right" to commit rape or to commit felonies resulting in death.
Yet equating the criminal punishment of conduct, such as imprison-
ment of megafruit possessors, with the placement of obstacles in the
path of that conduct, such as megafruit interdiction, would produce
the following argument: if it is acceptable to burden rape and felony
murder, acts that do not constitute protected conduct, then it is also
acceptable to provide the individual with the option of either avoiding
the prohibited conduct altogether or suffering the consequences, here
execution.119
118 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-98 (1977) (holding that execution of rapists
violates eighth amendment); cf. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 146-58 (1987) (holding that
execution of felony-murderers does not violate eighth amendment proirided there is a
showing of recklessness by felon with respect to possibility of fatality).
119 It is true that "death is different," see, e.g., Gilmore v. Taylor, 113 S. Ct. 2112, 2117
(1993) (stating that "the Eighth Amendment requires a greater degree of accuracy and fact
finding [in a capital case] than would be true in a noncapital case"), and that rights pro-
vided in the capital context are not necessarily generalizable to the noncapital context, id.
(citing Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990);
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980)). This unique treatment of the death penalty, how-
ever, does not detract from the Court's acknowledgment, through the death penalty cases,
that punishment of an activity is distinct from prevention of an activity. In other words,
even though the Court might allow imprisonment but not execution of rapists, it must
acknowledge that just as execution of rapists deprives them of their lives, so then does their
imprisonment deprive them of their liberty from confinement.
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The premise of the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment is a rejection of this "greater includes the
lesser" reasoning. The eighth amendment requires that punishments
be scrutinized even when they penalize conduct that is itself unpro-
tected. The jurisprudence of the eighth amendment accordingly con-
stitutes a recognition that criminal penalties provide more than simply
a deterrent or burden upon the specified criminal conduct. The cases
recognize that there will be people who violate the criminal law in
spite of the penalties they might face, so that the punishment itself
must not be "cruel and unusual." The government may therefore stop
an individual from committing rape or felony murder without offense
to the Constitution, but may not simply give that individual the choice
of avoiding the crime or suffering the death penalty.
One might respond that just as the eighth amendment refutes the
equation between burdens and criminal penalties, it simultaneously
dispenses with the need for separate due process scrutiny of such pen-
alties. The eighth amendment, in that sense, may provide both a
sword with which to attack the constitutionality of various criminal
penalties120 and a shield against a substantive due process attack on
the very same penalties. After all, if deprivation of liberty or life in
the form of criminal punishment must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest, then an eighth amendment requirement that
it also not be cruel and unusual would appear to be redundant.
There are a number of responses to this argument. First, the con-
clusion that a punishment that satisfies strict scrutiny would necessar-
ily satisfy the eighth amendment is not valid. For example, one could
conceive of a crime that the state has a compelling interest in prevent-
ing but that could only be addressed effectively by public mutilation of
the convict. The Court might nonetheless hold that such a punish-
ment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment' 2' under our evolving
standards of decency, even though it is the least restrictive means of
addressing a serious crime.
More importantly, the argument fails even if we accept the as-
sumption that strict scrutiny under the due process clause would al-
ways provide greater protection than the eighth amendment. The
120 Although the eighth amendment is theoretically a sword to be used against all crimi-
nal penalties, it would be difficult to locate in the current doctrine any eighth amendment
limits upon either the availability or the length of incarceration for a given offense after the
Court's decision in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). See note 9 supra.
121 See, e.g., Peter M. Spett, Confounding the Gradations of Iniquity: An Analysis of
Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Set Forth in Hannelin v. Michigan, 24 Colum. Hum.
Rts. L. Rev. 203, 205 n.l (1992-93) (discussing notion that eighth amendment conceptual-
izes cruel and unusual punishments to include ban on "barbarous and torturous penalties"
and "punishment such as... whipping, and cutting the ears off criminals").
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argument that the Bill of Rights defines the outer boundary of individ-
ual liberties is one that has been rejected by the Supreme Court on
many occasions.122 The Court's unenumerated rights jurisprudence
constitutes a rejection of the proposition that the Bill of Rights (in-
cluding the eighth amendment), precludes more extensive protection
for individual freedom.
Strict scrutiny of criminal penalties would, of course, provide not
only more protection than, but also more of the same kind of protec-
tion as, the eighth amendment. Therefore, one could argue that while
in general we may locate additional rights in the due process clause,
we cannot find two constitutional rights that overlap substantially,
such as the due process rights to life and liberty and the right against
cruel and unusual punishment. The response to this argument is that
the Constitution is not the word of God, composed on one occasion
with no superfluous verbiage. The fifth amendment might contem-
plate limb amputation as legitimate criminal punishment by requiring
that individuals not be "twice put in jeopardy of life or limb,"' 23 while
the eighth amendment might render limb-removal unconstitutional
cruel and unusual punishment. Similarly, the eighth amendment
might implicitly contemplate punishments that are not narrowly tai-
lored to serve compelling state interests, while the fourteenth amend-
ment jurisprudence, begun much later than the ratification of the
eighth amendment, might place such penalties off limits, when the
fundamental right to liberty from confinement is involved. 124
In an opinion for the Court in United States v. James Daniel Good
Real Property,125 a case involving the seizure of real property subject
to civil forfeiture, Justice Kennedy accordingly emphasized that "[w]e
have rejected the view that the applicability of one constitutional
amendment pre-empts the guarantees of another.' 26 He continued
that
[t]hough the Fourth Amendment places limits on the Government's
power to seize property for purposes of forfeiture, it does not pro-
122 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1992) (citing cases
demonstrating that Court has never accepted view that liberty encompasses no more than
those rights guaranteed expressly within first eight amendments to Constitution). For an
earlier discussion of the Court's rejection of the Bill of Rights as a boundary for individual
liberties, see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), in which Justice Harlan recognized that
"the full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or
limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitu-
tion." Id. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting on jurisdictional grounds).
123 U.S. Const. amend V.
124 Cf. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution 21 (1991)
(arguing that one constitutional provision may proscribe what another appears to permit).
125 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
126 Id. at 499.
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vide the sole measure of constitutional protection that must be af-
forded property owners in forfeiture proceedings. So even
assuming that the Fourth Amendment were satisfied in this case, it
remains for us to determine whether the seizure complied with our
well-settled jurisprudence under the Due Process Clause.127
In other words, the existence of the fourth amendment does not fore-
close the applicability of procedural due process requirements.128
This conception of constitutional overlap is equally applicable to the
eighth amendment and substantive due process. The ban on cruel and
unusual punishment therefore does not define the outer boundary of
constitutional protection against imprisonment. It does, however, af-
firmatively demonstrate that punishment, including a prison sentence,
cannot be justified solely by resort to the unprotected nature of the
prohibited conduct.
Thus, the equation between burdening unprotected conduct and
punishing that conduct with imprisonment is flawed. Although it is
tempting to equate the two because of punishment's role as a deter-
rent to prohibited conduct, one must consider the validity of punish-
ment as a separate constitutional matter. The eighth amendment
requires scrutiny of every form of punishment, with a concomitant de-
termination of whether it is cruel and unusual. Substantive due pro-
cess additionally requires strict scrutiny of every deprivation of a
fundamental fight. Because incarceration involves both punishment
and the deprivation of a fundamental right, incarceration must accord-
ingly withstand scrutiny under both the eighth amendment and the
due process clause of the fourteenth (or fifth) amendment. Equating
a ban on conduct with incarceration for that conduct fails to place any
127 Id. at 500.
128 Note, however, that the Court has sometimes said the opposite. In Albright v. Oli-
ver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994), in the context of a claim regarding a pretrial deprivation of
liberty, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in a plurality opinion that when a specific amend-
ment provides explicit constitutional protection against a particular type of governmental
behavior, that amendment, and not substantive due process, should be the basis for evalu-
ating the claim. Id. at 813 (plurality opinion). The better principle is the one that allows
for potential constitutional redundancy, for the reasons given in the text. Moreover, the
principle that fourteenth amendment substantive due process is general, open-ended, and
can only inadequately inform judicial decisionmaking is particularly perverse in Albright.
The alternative theory in Albright uses the fourth amendment, as applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Therefore, substantive due process is the vehicle for
application of the fourth amendment in the first place. Finally, while the eighth amend-
ment addresses all kinds of punishment, the right against deprivations of liberty from con-
finement exists whether or not there has been a criminal conviction occasioning
punishment. Therefore, the appropriately specific amendment to use in evaluating incar-
ceration is not obvious. Cf. L. Tribe & M. Dorf, supra note 124, at 101-04 (discussing
inherent flexibility of any notion of rights that is tied to the specificity of their articulation
in a given case).
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substantive burden upon the government to justify its decision to reg-
ulate conduct through incarceration.
B. Blinded by Procedure
As emphasized above, there is currently an absence of substantive
limitations on the availability of incarceration as a means of social
control. This absence, however, is overwhelmed by, and perhaps at-
tributable in part to, the presence of abundant procedural protections
from incarceration. The intuition that criminal defendants already
have enough constitutional rights is an appealing one. In other words,
the Court and constitutional scholars may be unwilling to scrutinize
imprisonment substantively because they are permitting procedure to
serve as a surrogate for substance in the area of the criminal law.129
From the time that the government decides to investigate a crime
through the moment of conviction, the criminal suspect is cloaked
with numerous procedural safeguards. The police may not perform
unreasonable searches and seizures, and any evidence discovered as a
result of such searches and seizures will be excluded from the state's
case at trial.130 The police may not question a suspect in custody with-
out providing warnings, 131 and if the suspect asks for an attorney, the
police may not question the suspect outside the presence of her attor-
ney (appointed if necessary) absent initiation by the suspect.132 All
confessions obtained in violation of these principles are also excluded
from the state's case at trial.1 33 Identification of a suspect must be
129 Cf. Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Sur-
rogates For Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1625, 1656-79 (1992) (dis-
cussing procedure as a surrogate for substance in immigration law).
130 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-87 (1963) (finding that verbal
evidence derived from unlawful entry and unauthorized arrest is inadmissible "fruit" of
official illegality); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-60 (1961) (holding that the states must
exclude all evidence obtained in violation of fourth amendment). For impeachment excep-
tions to the exclusionary rule, see United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 624-28 (1980)
(allowing impeachment of witness' responses to cross-examination with illegal evidence);
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65-66 (1954) (allowing illegally seized evidence to be
introduced for limited purpose of impeachment).
131 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966) (creating prophylactic barrier to
coerced confessions).
132 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-87 (1981) (holding that once individual in-
vokes her right to counsel while in custody, any statements made in response to interroga-
tion outside presence of counsel will be suppressed, unless initiated by the suspect); see
also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 150-56 (1990) (extending Edwards to interroga-
tion that takes place after suspect has met with counsel but outside presence of counsel).
But see Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350,2355-56 (1994) (holding that ambiguous or
equivocal reference to counsel after waiver of Miranda rights is not invocation of the right
to counsel under Edwards).
133 Unlike coerced confessions, see New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 456-60 (1979)
(holding that testimony given in response to grant of immunity is "essence of coerced testi-
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reliable and free of improper suggestion.134 And in federal cases, the
prosecution may not proceed unless a grand jury has issued an
indictment. 135
The defendant, perhaps most importantly, has a right to a trial by
jury.136 Once the trial begins, the defendant has a right to testify,137 as
well as a right not to do so.' 38 The judge and the prosecution may not
comment adversely on a defendant's failure to testify.139 The defen-
dant has a right to compel the production of witnesses and evidence in
her favor, 40 and the state must produce any exculpatory evidence in
its possession upon request. 41 The defendant has a right to be pres-
ent at trial, 42 and to confront, or cross examine, all of the state's wit-
nesses. 143 She also has a right to the assistance of counsel at trial,
whether or not she can afford to pay for that assistance.144 Finally, she
has the right to a judgment of acquittal if the state cannot prove guilt
mony" and is inadmissible even for impeachment purposes), non-Mirandized confessions
may be admitted into evidence to impeach contradictory testimony by a criminal defen-
dant. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26 (1971).
134 See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 382-86 (1968) (holding that under some
circumstances, photographic array used in identification process may be unduly sugges-
tive); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (arguing that totality of circumstances
must be considered to determine whether identification was result of unnecessarily sugges-
tive conduct by police).
135 U.S. Const. amend. V; see Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 423-26 (1885) (giving in-
dictment requirement broad scope).
136 U.S. Const. amend. VI; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968) (find-
ing right to jury trial so "necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty" that it
merited incorporation against states through fourteenth amendment).
137 See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-53 (1987) (finding constitutional right to tes-
tify on one's own behalf at criminal trial, derived from due process clause, compulsory
process clause, and guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination).
138 U.S. Const. amend. V.
139 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that fifth amendment prohib-
its comments by prosecution on an accused's silence or instructions by court that silence is
evidence of guilt).
140 U.S. Const. amend. VI; see Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 55-56 (1987) (hold-
ing that compulsory process clause allows defendant to obtain government's aid in compel-
ling attendance of witnesses).
141 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ('T]he suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or punishment. .. ").
142 See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 454-59 (1912) (holding that, while the sixth
amendment gives criminally accused right to attend trial, defendant may waive this right).
Cases after Diaz clarified further limits on this right. See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S.
17, 19-20 (1973) (holding that judge need not warn defendant that if defendant absents
herself during trial she waives right to be present); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43
(1970) (conditioning right to be present at trial on defendant's adherence to decorous and
respectful behavior).
143 See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-18 (1974) (finding confrontation clause viola-
tion in refusal to allow cross-examination of juvenile delinquent who testified for state).
144 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963).
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beyond a reasonable doubt,145 or if the jury is not told that the state
bears this burden of persuasion.1'46
Only the person accused of a crime receives such an impressive
array of procedural rights. The fact that a defendant could lose her
liberty no doubt accounts for the existence of so many safeguards. 147
Far from enjoying a lesser constitutional status, then, the right to lib-
erty from incarceration might appear to enjoy much greater security
than the other rights incorporated within the word "liberty" in the due
process clause.
The appearance is deceptive. The procedural protections ideally
ensure that individuals who are innocent of the charges against them
are acquitted' 48 and that all defendants are treated humanely and
fairly in the process of assessing their guilt or innocence. In addition,
investigatory procedural rights protect an individual's privacy from
unwarranted intrusion and require that state officials do not resort to
brutality in their attempts to solve a crime. However, procedural
rights do nothing for the person who is fairly adjudged guilty of violat-
ing the criminal law.149 In other words, procedural rights do not re-
quire the state to justify its confinement of an individual who
committed the charged offense.
The individual who is caught in possession of megafruit in viola-
tion of the criminal law is not concerned primarily about the right to
confront witnesses against her or about proof of guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. She is concerned that the state ought not deprive her
of her most precious liberty, freedom from incarceration, to protect an
145 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970).
146 See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078,2082 (1993) (holding that reasonable doubt
instruction that violates due process because it fails to convey proper burden of proof can
-never be harmless error).
147 See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,39-40 (1972) (holding that sixth amend-
ment right to counsel extends to misdemeanor trial in which defendant is actually sen-
tenced to incarceration).
148 Although the goal of minimizing erroneous convictions is one of several goals of the
criminal justice system, many would argue that it is the goal of the highest priority. The
Supreme Court has often stated that it is "a fundamental value determination of our soci-
ety that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." In re
Winship, 397 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring); see also Williams v. United States, 401
U.S. 646, 653 (1971) (plurality opinion) (prioritizing truth-finding functions of trials); Te-
han v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (finding impairment of truth-
finding function of primary concern in criminal cases).
149 Conversely, giving an individual additional substantive rights cannot adequately
compensate for a loss of procedural protection. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
585-87 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (arguing that individual cannot be deprived of
liberty from confinement through civil commitment (i.e., without the extensive procedural
protections provided by the criminal process) simply because individual will then be
granted substantive right to medical treatment; therefore, individual properly confined
does not thereby acquire any substantive right to medical treatment).
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interest that may not be very important. Just as imprisonment of this
individual is not the equivalent of making megafruit unavailable to
her, similarly, making the state prove that she indeed possesses the
fruit is not the equivalent of making the state justify imprisonment for
such possession.
If there is indeed a fundamental right to liberty from confine-
ment, then that right must receive substantive as well as procedural
protection, strict scrutiny as well as proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Procedure cannot serve as a proper surrogate for substance.
Consider the following example. A state passes a law requiring
hospitals to obtain a husband's consent before performing an abortion
on a married woman. 150 Jane Roe, a married woman, comes to the
hospital seeking an abortion. Her husband, John Roe, refuses to con-
sent to that abortion. No one could seriously argue that instead of
striking down the law, a court could require a hearing in which the
state must prove that John Roe is indeed married to Jane Roe and
that he refuses to consent to her abortion. Such a hearing would be
irrelevant to the right to abortion, because the husband-consent re-
quirement itself violates the undue burden substantive test.151 Proce-
dure cannot serve as a substitute for substance because the ultimate
legitimacy of procedure is contingent on the legitimacy of the substan-
tive law that it serves to apply.
C. A Philosophy of Deference
We have seen that the equations of prevention with punishment
and of procedure with substance play a role in creating the common
but flawed intuition that deprivations of liberty from incarceration
should not be subject to strict scrutiny. These equations set the right
to liberty from incarceration apart from other fundamental rights by
conceiving of its deprivation as purely an instrument of social control
that is accompanied by uniquely abundant procedural safeguards.
Perhaps the equations are made because prisons serve a central func-
tion in the enforcement of the criminal law. In this sense, we tend to
equate criminal justice with prison and defer to them both.
150 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-72 (1976) (holding state
spousal consent statute unconstitutional); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2831 (1992) (holding husband notification provision of state law unconstitutional).
151 See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2831; see also id. at 2842-43 (Stevens, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (applying undue burden test to find most of Pennsylvania statute uncon-
stitutional); Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan. L.
Rev. 235, 272 n.153 (1994) (arguing that undue burden test in Casey reflects plurality's
understanding of what strict scrutiny entails in abortion context).
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The criminal justice system plays an important symbolic role in
our national consciousness.' 52 The system ideally protects citizens
from danger, from anarchy, and from moral chaos. It constitutes an
army of sorts, charged with fighting the enemy from within, the "crim-
inal." As with the military, 5 3 we tend to defer to the criminal justice
system because we perceive ourselves as incompetent to evaluate its
efficacy. The workings of the criminal law in this sense occupy an
opaque box - like the jury room - upon whose contents we are
afraid to gaze.
We tolerate military policies that would never survive civilian re-
view. We also refuse to ask jurors to explain their deliberation pro-
cess, and we countenance the rejection of a jury verdict only when "no
reasonable juror" could have possibly come to a given conclusion con-
sistent with our legal system.1 54 Similarly, we strike down a criminal
statute only when (1) the statute bears no reasonable relation to any
legitimate state interest,'55 (2) the purported criminal has been pun-
ished for conduct that is itself protected by the Constitution, 5 6 or (3)
the punishment is barbaric or grossly disproportionate to the crime at
issue.157 It is tempting to let the legislative guardians of citizens' se-
152 See Walter B. Miller, Ideology and Criminal Justice Policy: Some Current Issues, 64
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 141, 143-44, 157 (1973) (arguing that failure of criminal process
to administer punishment effectively diminishes deterrent value of criminal law as well as
public confidence in justice system).
153 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (stating that judicial re-
view of military regulations is "far more deferential than constitutional review of similar
laws or regulations designed for civilian society" in the context of a free exercise clause
case); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (holding, in race discrimination case,
that unique disciplinary structure of military and Congress's activity in that field both con-
stitute special factors that prevent enlisted military personnel from recovering damages
against their superior officers for constitutional violations); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S.
57, 65-68 (1981) (citing cases applying high level of deference in addressing overbroad
restraints on first amendment activity and deprivations of substantive due process in the
military, in the context of a gender discrimination claim).
154 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,368 (1970) (reversible error to convict when no
reasonable juror could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
155 See note 47 supra.
156 See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
157 See, e.g., Spett, supra note 121, at 205-06 n.11 (stating that eighth amendment pro-
hibits as cruel and unusual punishment "barbarous and torturous penalties" and "punish-
ments such as . . . whipping, and cutting the ears off criminals"); see also Farmer v.
Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994) (holding that prison officials may be held liable
under eighth amendment for prison conditions if they knew of substantial risk of serious
harm to inmate subjected to these conditions and they disregarded that risk); Hudson v.
McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000 (1992) (finding use of excessive physical force against pris-
oner violation of eighth amendment, even without showing of permanent injury); Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991) (requiring that prisoner demonstrate deliberate indiffer-
ence on the part of prison authorities as necessary part of proving eighth amendment claim
arising from prison conditions); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (holding that
prison conditions may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under contemporary stan-
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curity do as they see fit. But as the cases providing an abundance of
procedural due process make clear, courts must be concerned with the
unchecked use of incarceration in the criminal justice system.
In defending deference to criminal justice, one might argue that
criminal justice itself represents a compelling state interest and that
legislative and executive flexibility are necessary to serve that end. If
we place too many limitations upon the criminal justice system, it will
fail to function. People must learn to obey the criminal law, whether
it prohibits activity that is malum prohibitum or malum in se.158 The
burden of self-justification should be on the criminal who flouts the
law rather than on the government from which that law emanates.
This argument proves too much, however. If a law, for example,
prohibits the exercise of the right to free speech, then the "compelling
interest in the law" approach would permit enforcement of that law.
If, on the other hand, fundamental rights are different and cannot be
compromised for the abstract principle of "respect for the law," then
deprivations of liberty from confinement, like prohibitions against
protected speech, cannot be justified simply by invoking the need for
obedience to law, without reference to the content of a particular law.
In this way, the argument that securing obedience to the criminal
law constitutes an inherently compelling interest is circular. The sig-
nificance of designating a right as "fundamental" under the due pro-
cess clause is that legislation burdening such a right must be justified
by a compelling governmental interest. That compelling interest must
be one that is independent of the passage of the legislation itself.
Otherwise, the only legitimate challenge to deprivations of fundamen-
tal rights would consist of disputes about the process by which the law
came into being. Simply put, the requirement that a law be justified
cannot be met by mere appeal to the fact that the law is indeed a law.
This is particularly true when we consider the fact that criminal stat-
utes are enacted by the same process as all other statutes. To give all
criminal laws an elevated status, then, would arbitrarily remove the
normal constitutional barriers to passage of legislation burdening the
exercise of fundamental rights.
Moreover, if we assume arguendo the legitimacy of placing the
criminal law and its enforcement beyond constitutional attack, then
criminal procedure rules become utterly inexplicable. Police officers,
those law enforcement officials who most resemble the military in
dards of decency if they deny the "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities"); Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (first extending eighth amendment to prisoner's com-
plaint of deprivation suffered while in prison).
158 These phrases mean, respectively, "wrong because prohibited" and "wrong in itself."
Black's Law Dictionary 959-60 (6th ed. 1990).
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their need to be armed and in their direct confrontation with the
armed enemy, are subjected to significant restraints on their ability to
fight even serious crime. They must normally have probable cause
and a warrant to perform searches;159 they must warn individuals
under arrest about their rights;160 and they may use deadly force only
in a limited set of circumstances. 161 Similarly, judges and juries, the
individuals charged with adjudicating the truth of criminal complaints,
must acquit individuals against whom the evidence is very strong but
does not eliminate all reasonable doubt.1 62 The fact-finders must also
ignore or be shielded from probative evidence that came to light as a
result of constitutional violations. 63 If our goal is truly to empower
the criminal justice system because it serves an inherently compelling
governmental interest, providing it with substantive carte blanche
while simultaneously burdening it with disabling procedural limita-
tions would seem a seriously misguided strategy.
Finally, the importance of criminal justice in general cannot logi-
caly support the substantive deference entailed in applying mere ra-
tional basis scrutiny to criminal laws providing for incarceration. One
could legitimately worry that questioning the incarceration of murder-
ers would be devastating to personal security. Successful substantive
challenges to the use of incarceration, however, would necessarily
concern only the more ambiguous offenses that do not endanger the
community's safety. The restriction through incarceration of a dan-
gerous and violent criminal would not, in other words, be subject to
serious challenge because restraint of a dangerous person is necessary
to the community's security.' 64 Rather, the use of incarceration is
159 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (broadly interpreting fourth
amendment warrant requirement).
160 See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
161 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S, 1, 3 (1985) (requiring more than probable cause to
justify use of deadly force against fleeing felon).
162 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,368 (1970) (finding criminal conviction to be revers-
ible error when no reasonable juror could have found guilt beyond reasonable doubt).
163 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (finding defendant's statements
inadmissible absent proper police warnings); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961). But see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (establishing "good faith"
exception to exclusionary rule in certain circumstances); Quarles v. New York, 467 U.S.
649, 655 (1984) (announcing public safety exception to Miranda); Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (establishing impeachment exception to exclusion of evidence ob-
tained in violation of Miranda); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (establish-
ing impeachment exception to exclusionary rule).
164 For this reason, mentally ill and dangerous individuals may be committed to institu-
tional confinement. See text accompanying notes 26-38 supra. For this reason as well,
pretrial detention without bail is permissible for dangerous accused offenders. See Salerno
v. United States, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (emphasizing need for proof that each individual
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most vulnerable to attack when the "offense" itself is not much of an
offense at all.
We do not, for example, incarcerate individuals who use mari-
juana primarily to restrain them. Our concern with drugs involves is-
sues of diminished productivity, potential health risks, and perhaps
the moral judgment that pursuit of pleasure ought to be confined to
particular, permissible avenues. 165 Therefore, there is a generalized
interest in limiting the amount of drug use in our society. From the
perspective of the person incarcerated for smoking marijuana, how-
ever, these generalized goals and priorities do not sufficiently explain
why her physical liberty has been taken away. If incarceration is not
necessary to a compelling interest, then the state does not confront
the "enemy" when it incarcerates the criminal; it confronts decent in-
dividuals and strips them of their most prized freedom-their liberty
from confinement. Though it may be necessary to national security to
require absolute obedience and conformity on the battlefield, it serves
neither national security nor respect for the law to allow the govern-
ment to incarcerate at will. By allowing almost anything to be a crime,
punishable by imprisonment, the state teaches its citizens that criminal
justice does not necessarily coincide with actual justice; it teaches con-
tempt for the law that may impair obedience not only to the laws in-
spiring that contempt, but to the most necessary and important laws as
well. 166 It may be no coincidence that in the United States, there are
more people in prison as well as more violent crime, per capita, than
in almost any other industrialized nation.167
arrestee presents an identifiable and articulable threat to community); see also text accom-
panying notes 177-90 infra (discussing potential impact of strict scrutiny upon various crim-
inal laws currently in existence).
165 See, e.g., Mark A.R. Kleiman, Against Excess: Drug Policy For Results 27-28, 67-69
(1992) (indicating that dangers of drugs include bad results of intoxicated behavior, de-
crease in reliability of individual on drugs in carrying out responsibilities inherent in our
social system, and questioning rationale behind criminal legislation against recreational use
of drugs).
166 Cf. Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug Prohibition and the Weakness of Public Pol-
icy, 103 Yale L.J. 2593, 2596 (1994) (reviewing Steven B. Duke & Albert C. Gross,
America's Longest War: Rethinking Our Tragic Crusade Against Drugs (1993)) (explain-
ing that "the inflation of crimes diminishes the significance attached to each. As more
conduct is criminalized in order to 'send a message' of societal disapproval, enforcement of
each crime declines. Consequently, the message actually delivered to prospective criminals
becomes less meaningful.").
167 See Raymond Paternoster, Capital Punishment in America 217 (1991) (indicating
that "[h]omicide rates in the United States are higher than in any Western country"); Elli-
ott Currie, Crime, Justice, and the Social Environment, in The Politics of Law: A Progres-
sive Critique 294, 299 (David Kairys ed., 1990) (indicating that "the United States
imprisoned a far higher proportion of its citizens than any advanced industrial society
outside the [former] Soviet bloc"); David Rudovsky, The Criminal Justice System and the
Role of the Police, in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, supra, at 314, 314 (stat-
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As we have seen, the equation between prohibition and punish-
ment, the substitution of process for substance, and a deferential ap-
proach to criminal justice are all inadequate bases for treating the
fundamental right to liberty from physical confinement differently
from other fundamental rights. Therefore, this fundamental right
must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny. Part IV attempts ten-
tatively to suggest how strict scrutiny might work in the context of
liberty from physical confinement.
IV
CONSTRUCiNG A BETMR DocrmN
If we acknowledge that liberty from confinement is indeed a fun-
damental right, and we take seriously the resulting unconstitutionality
of conditioning retention of this fundamental right on conduct to be
chosen at will by the legislature, it is necessary to apply strict scrutiny
to every law that deprives an individual of that fundamental right.168
Until this point, this Article has addressed the theoretical objec-
tions to such a proposal and has demonstrated that they are uncon-
vincing. It has established that liberty from confinement cannot be
relegated to the status of unprotected aspects of daily life, subject to
any regulation that is not utterly irrational. It has shown that notwith-
standing the unconstitutionality of such an approach, liberty from con-
finement has in fact been treated in this very fashion. Demonstrating
this doctrinal inconsistency has been the primary goal of this Article,
and a full examination of the consequences and choices accompanying
an adoption of strict scrutiny for deprivations of liberty from confine-
ment would entail years of judicial development. In this Part, how-
ever, I begin the process of describing the meaning of strict scrutiny of
deprivations of liberty from confinement. I also raise some potential
difficulties with the application of this heightened standard of review
to much of the criminal law and offer some tentative solutions as well.
ing that the United States "sends a higher proportion of its people to prison for longer
periods of time than any country other than South Africa and the [former] Soviet Union").
168 Professors Murphy and Coleman have similarly observed in connection with depriva-
tions of liberty and life that constitute the core of criminal penalties that "[a]dapting consti-
tutional language from a somewhat different context, one might seek to discover if criminal
punishment, as a mechanism that encumbers fundamental rights of persons, is indeed the
least restrictive means that could be employed to accomplish whatever compelling goals or
interests the state currently seeks to attain through punishment." Jeffrie G. Murphy &
Jules L. Coleman, The Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to Jurisprudence 113 (1984).
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A. Strict Scrutiny of Incarceration
In most instances, once the courts recognize that some activity or
status constitutes a fundamental right, the government tends to adopt
a hands-off policy toward that activity or status. The government does
not, for example, levy special taxes on contraception or procreation.
Nor does it place limits on consenting adults' freedom to marry the
individuals they choose.169 When the government does attempt to
place explicit limits upon fundamental rights such as free speech, such
limits are typically struck down.170 In a sense, it is easy to manage a
fundamental rights jurisprudence in which strict scrutiny is "fatal in
fact."' 171 The government regulates at will outside the area of funda-
mental rights, while it attempts to avoid regulating at all within that
area.172 It may be harder to regulate a fundamental right in modera-
tion, as the government would have to do with the fundamental right
to liberty from confinement, than to abstain from regulation
altogether.
The "hands-off" jurisprudence typically associated with funda-
mental rights is not a feasible alternative to adopt as we begin to ac-
knowledge the status of liberty from confinement as a fundamental
right. Courts cannot simply invalidate imprisonment in the way that
they can invalidate bans on contraception. Imprisonment is often nec-
essary for a variety of reasons. For example, certain classes of
criminals are dangerous to society, and alternatives to confinement
(other than death) would not adequately restrain such criminals from
continuing to pose a threat to the security of free citizens. Physical
restraint, in other words, is an important part of the government's ca-
pacity to ensure public safety. In addition, the eighth amendment lim-
169 This is of course only true when there are two individuals, see Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 164-66 (1878) (holding that even religious practice does not
insulate polygamy from criminal prosecution), and when the two individuals are of the
opposite sex, cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that homosexual
sodomy may be constitutionally criminalized by the states).
170 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (holding that conviction for flag
desecration is inconsistent with first amendment); American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut,
771 F.2d 323, 334 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding ordinance prohibiting pornography that discrimi-
nates on the basis of sex an infringement on right to free speech).
171 For the use of this phrase to describe the nature of strict scrutiny, see Gerald Gun-
ther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972).
172 The area of abortion has been a notable exception to this rule. Legislatures have,
since the time that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973), announced abortion's status
as a fundamental right, attempted to test the limits of the decision by enacting laws
presenting various obstacles to reproductive choice. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2810 (1992) (examining various restrictions on access to abortion);
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772
(1986) (striking down various abortion restrictions, including a waiting period).
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its the availability of punishments other than prison for crime.173
When other alternatives are unconstitutional under the eighth amend-
ment, that fact necessarily affects the resulting need for prison.
This proposal therefore does not call for the elimination of
prison. It requires instead a close evaluation of criminal laws that util-
ize imprisonment as a penalty for violations. The evaluation ought to
consist of asking two familiar questions: (1) Does the incarceration of
individuals who commit this offense serve a compelling state interest?
and (2) Is the deprivation of liberty from confinement narrowly tai-
lored to serve the compelling state interest?
1. Compelling Interests
The compelling interest inquiry may result in the more significant
transformation of the criminal law because it will place some unpro-
tected conduct beyond the reach of incarceration. The classification
of compelling state interests, like the recognition and delimitation of
fundamental rights, is a process that will occasion debate. This fact,
however, does not release judges from their obligation to engage in
this process as a necessary part of fundamental rights constitutional
analysis.
In addition to the question of hard cases, one might understanda-
bly express alarm at the prospect of having the courts apply strict scru-
tiny to every single criminal prosecution seeking a penalty of
incarceration. Such a requirement might appear at first glance to
present an excessive burden upon an already taxed criminal justice
system. In fact, the burden would not have to be so great. The identi-
fication of compelling interests sufficient to justify incarceration could
take place on a categorical rather than an individual, case-by-case
basis.
The Supreme Court has effectively managed the disposition of a
different fundamental right through such categorical judgments. In
173 See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that death penalty is
cruel and unusual punishment for crime of rape). Though the Court has not explicitly
addressed the eighth amendment status of punishments such as whipping and limb amputa-
tion, even conservative scholars such as Judge Robert Bork have indicated their belief that
such punishments would be unconstitutional. See, e.g., May It Please The Court 234 (Peter
Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds., 1993) (quoting oral argument in Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976), where Justice Stewart is listed as asking the following question: "What if a
state said for the most heinous kind of first-degree murders we are going to inflict breaking
a man on the wheel and then disemboweling him while he is still alive and then burning
him up: What would you say to that?" Then-Solicitor General Bork is listed as responding
as follows: "I would say that that practice is so out of step with modem morality and
modem jurisprudence that the state cannot return to it. That kind of torture was precisely
what the framers thought they were outlawing when they wrote the cruel and unusual
punishments clause.").
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the first amendment area, the Court has identified several forms of
speech that are not constitutionally protected, including obscenity,174
fighting words,175 and defamation. 176 The lower courts and eventually
the Supreme Court could similarly identify categories of activities for
which the penalty of incarceration could be imposed.
To reduce the abstraction of this discussion, consider various po-
tential interests that might justify incarceration of individuals con-
victed of crimes in the United States. Least controversial perhaps is
the proposition that there is a compelling interest in protecting citi-
zens from violence and the threat of violence. Therefore, the state
may utilize incarceration to restrain violent criminals and disable them
from committing further acts of violence, to deter other potential vio-
lent criminals, and to punish the violence, thereby giving effect to the
societal outrage that rightly accompanies a serious harm. It follows
from this analysis that from a fundamental rights due process stand-
point, incarceration for such crimes as murder, rape, assault, battery,
and robbery would be beyond constitutional reproach.
A second-tier compelling state interest might be the interest in
protecting citizens' property. Just as in the fourth amendment con-
text, the prevention of property deprivation is not as compelling as the
prevention of physical violence. 177 Nonetheless, most courts would
find that the state does have a compelling interest in protecting pri-
vate property and therefore in addressing crimes that threaten private
property. Incarceration of those who commit crimes such as burglary,
larceny, auto theft, and embezzlement would therefore generally sur-
vive the compelling interest prong of strict scrutiny. Incarceration of
such criminals restrains them from further predatory behavior while it
deters other potential predators as well. Hard cases might arise when
the amount of property appropriated is negligible.178 Courts may ac-
cordingly develop a doctrine requiring a minimum loss of property
174 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) ("This much has been categorically
settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.").
175 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (enumerating types of
speech, including "fighting words," which are not entitled to first amendment protection).
176 See New York Tunes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (recognizing that
reckless defamation is not protected by first amendment).
177 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (holding, in case of burglary suspect,
that fourth amendment prohibits use of deadly force to prevent escape of suspect who
poses no threat of physical injury to others); cf. U.S. Const. amend. V (allowing govern-
ment to appropriate private property as long as it provides just compensation).
178 Such a hard case might arise, for example, when the crime at issue is shoplifting a
small quantity of food.
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before the state's concern in addressing the act rises to the level of a
compelling interest.179
One category of laws that presents a strong case for invalidation
as violating the liberty from confinement consists of laws that provide
for incarceration for use or possession of recreational drugs such as
marijuana. Although few courts take the position that there is a con-
stitutional right to use marijuana,180 it does not follow that users and
possessors of marijuana may be incarcerated. Like the hypothetical
megafruit discussed above, 181 marijuana may be made unavailable or
taxed without constitutional infirmity, solely because the use of mari-
juana is not itself protected. If the government chooses to incarcerate
those who use and possess marijuana, however, it must first articulate
a compelling interest that justifies an infringement upon the liberty
from confinement.
The paternalistic argument that the government incarcerates the
marijuana user to protect her from herself is exceedingly weak, given
the data available about marijuana use.182 While an argument could
be made that drug pushers are invariably involved in property and
violent crimes to protect their business, their involvement in such
crimes can be prosecuted directly.8 3 Moreover, even if their preda-
tory behavior may be treated as inseparable from their drug business,
this fact certainly does not transform the drug user herself into a
179 Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973) (finding that state's interest in protect-
ing fetus is not compelling until fetus reaches viability, and that state may not, therefore,
impose criminal penalties for abortions obtained before point of viability).
180 But see Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975) (concluding that under
Alaska's state constitution, citizens have a basic right of privacy in their homes, which
encompasses the right to noncommercial possession and ingestion of marijuana).
181 See text accompanying note 95 supra.
182 Professor Barnett cites a study which points out that "[d]espite years of federally
subsidized research, the claimed adverse health effects of marijuana are still highly specula-
tive." Barnett, supra note 166, at 2602. He quotes a study that reported the following:
"Approximately 100 million Americans over the past three decades have smoked (or
eaten) marijuana. Millions of these have used marijuana on a regular, almost daily
basis for decades. Despite these massive numbers of long-term users, no reliable
evidence has appeared that such use has any adverse effects on their physical
health....
Other societies have used marijuana for centuries. Yet in no society has any
official or respected study found serious adverse physical effects on humans from
smoking marijuana. Indeed, in no less than nine official investigations of the prob-
lem, in both the United States and elsewhere, none have found any significant ad-
verse effects on human health, even mental health."
Id. (quoting S. Duke & A. Gross, supra note 166, at 51).
183 See notes 193-226 and accompanying text infra (discussing overinclusiveness
analysis).
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predator.184 Therefore, the interest in preventing all marijuana use,
while not an unconstitutional end, is also probably not a compelling
purpose sufficient to justify the incarceration of users and posses-
sors.18 5 A judge who agrees with this argument would consequently
invalidate laws providing for the incarceration of such individuals. 186
Another area of the criminal law that would become vulnerable if
liberty from confinement were treated as a fundamental right is the
consensual sexual area, including laws criminalizing homosexual activ-
ity and fornication1 87 Unlike the case of drug use and possession,
there are many who believe that the conduct of consensual sexual ac-
tivity is itself a protected fundamental right under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.188 Even if courts refuse to rec-
ognize this privacy right, however, they still might not consider the
prevention and punishment of such conduct compelling state interests
justifying incarceration. Justice White, speaking for the Court in
Hardwick, for example, made a point of avoiding an evaluation of the
wisdom of the sodomy law. He stated that "[t]his case does not re-
184 For an example of the differentiation between users and sellers in another context,
see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566-68 (1969) (holding that private use of obscene
materials is constitutionally protected, even though sale may be prohibited).
185 One might argue that there is a compelling interest in preventing and punishing con-
duct that is immoral, even if it harms no one. See generally J. Feinberg, supra note 13
(discussing and evaluating legitimacy of criminalizing conduct that is morally illicit, but that
does not adversely affect anyone's interests). This argument, however, would do away with
much of substantive due process. Laws prohibiting contraception, abortion, and interracial
marriage, for example, were justified on just such grounds. Justice Stevens has suggested
that "the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice;
neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitu-
tional attack." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186 Such laws include 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (Supp. IV 1992) (providing maximum prison
sentence of one year for possession of controlled substance when convict has no prior drug
convictions); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11357(a) (West 1991) ("[Elvery person who
possesses any concentrated cannabis shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail
for a period of not more than one year or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars
.... "); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 94C, § 34 (West 1984) (providing maximum jail sentence
of six months for possession of marijuana); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-9-102(2) (1993) (provid-
ing maximum jail sentence of six months imprisonment for criminal possession of mari-
juana or its derivatives in amount not exceeding 60 grams of marijuana or one gram of
hashish).
187 See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 22-1002 (1989) (criminalizing fornication); Ga. Code
Ann. § 16-6-2(a) (1990) (criminalizing consensual sodomy); Idaho Code § 18-6603 (1987)
(criminalizing consensual fornication); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.34 (West 1987) (criminaliz-
ing fornication); Va. Code Ann. § 182-345 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1994) (criminalizing
"lewd and lascivious cohabitation" of the unmarried); Wis. Stat. § 944.16 (1993) (criminal-
izing adultery).
188 See, e.g., L. Tribe, supra note 13, § 15-21, at 1427-28 (criticizing Hardwick); Tribe &
Dorf, supra note 104, at 1108 (asserting that Constitution's text points toward recognizing
broader right of "intimate personal association in the privacy of the home").
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quire a judgment on whether laws against sodomy between consenting
adults in general, or between homosexuals in particular, are wise or
desirable."'189 The compelling interest test would require such an in-
quiry, as long as imprisonment remained an available punishment for
consensual sodomy. Moreover, it is quite unlikely that the Supreme
Court would find a compelling interest in addressing such conduct, to
which opposition tends to be purely moral (or religious), given that
there is no credible claim that a harm is actually being addressed. 19°
2. Narrow Tailoring
Once the particular interest proposed to justify legislation is
deemed by a court to be compelling, the next step must be to evaluate
the relationship between the deprivation of a fundamental right and
the advancement of the compelling interest. One reason for this eval-
uation of close "fit" or narrow tailoring is that without such an
evaluation, any compelling interest could be invoked to justify any
legislation. A ban on all political speech, for example, could be justi-
fied by the compelling interest in preventing violence. It is the evalua-
tion of fit that ensures that the purported compelling interest is indeed
served (and served well) by the deprivation of the fundamental right.
Justice Blackmun explained this process in his dissenting opinion in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.191 He said,
in connection with a different fundamental right (the right to the free
exercise of religion):
A State may no more create an underinclusive statute, one that fails
truly to promote its purported compelling interest, than it may cre-
ate an overinclusive statute, one that encompasses more protected
conduct than necessary to achieve its goal. In the latter circum-
stance, the broad scope of the statute is unnecessary to serve the
interest, and the statute fails for that reason. In the former situa-
tion, the fact that allegedly harmful conduct falls outside the stat-
189 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190.
190 As noted above, see note 13 supra, I am here embracing a harm model, one that does
not recognize purely moral opposition to conduct as constituting a compelling governmen-
tal interest sufficient to override a fundamental right. Though one might adopt an alterna-
tive model that holds moral claims to be compelling, such a model would not permit the
invalidation of any law as violating a fundamental right, because the violation of any law
will offend some conception of morality. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (asserting in connection with law banning sodomy that "[like Justice Holmes, I
believe that '[ilt is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV" (quoting Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897))). For a detailed evaluation of the argument that morality
alone may justify criminal legislation, even where the legislation addresses no harm, see
generally J. Feinberg, supra note 13.
191 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
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ute's scope belies a governmental assertion that it has genuinely
pursued an interest "of the highest order." If the State's goal is im-
portant enough to prohibit [the exercise of a fundamental right] ...
it will not and must not stop at [the fundamental right]. 19
a. Overinclusiveness. The first requirement of narrow tailor-
ing, the requirement that legislation depriving individuals of a funda-
mental right not be overinclusive, has two potential implications. The
first is that the conceptual scope of the statute not extend beyond ar-
eas that actually serve the compelling interest. For example, a statute
that provides for the incarceration of those engaging in premarital
sex,193 to further the compelling interest in public health by shielding
citizens from deadly diseases, would be overinclusive. It would extend
beyond those instances of sexual activity that spread deadly diseases.
A narrower law, better tailored to the alleged compelling interest,
would provide for the incarceration of only those individuals with
deadly diseases engaging in premarital sex. This kind of logic
animated the Court's decision in Schneider v. New Jersey.194 In that
case, the Court invalidated four ordinances forbidding distribution of
leaflets. 195 The ordinances were defended as necessary to prevent
either fraud, trespass, or littering.196 The Court rejected these de-
fenses and refused to uphold the ordinances, noting that there were
other ways to accomplish these legitimate aims without abridging free-
dom of speech and press.197 Fraud, street littering, and trespass could
themselves be denounced and punished as offenses.198
I The second implication of the overinclusiveness inquiry has an
empirical component. Instead of asking at a theoretical level, as the
192 Id. at 2250-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
390 (1978) (invalidating certain restrictions on marriage as "grossly underinclusive with
respect to [their] purpose"); Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274,285 n.19 (1985) (finding
rule excluding nonresidents from the bar of New Hampshire "is underinclusive... because
it permits lawyers who move away from the State to retain their membership in the bar"))
(additional citation omitted).
193 Assume for purposes of this discussion that premarital sex is not itself a protected
fundamental right. For an example of a statute criminalizing such conduct, see Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 609.34 (West 1987) ("When any man and single woman have sexual intercourse
with each other, each is guilty of fornication, which is a misdemeanor.").
194 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
195 Id. at 164.
196 Id. at 162-64.
197 Id. at 164.
198 Id.; see also Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 63 (1960) (invalidating ordinance bar-
ring distribution of handbills except those labelled with the names and addresses of those
who prepared, distributed, or sponsored the handbills). The Court in Talley rejected coun-
sel's suggestions that the ordinance was intended to identify those responsible for fraud,
false advertising, and libel, in part because the ordinance was "in no manner so limited."
Id. at 64.
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first inquiry does, whether the scope of the statute is limited to ad-
dressing the proffered compelling interest, the question becomes
whether at a practical level, there are not less restrictive alternatives
that would achieve the same compelling interest without violating the
relevant fundamental right.
To understand this inquiry, consider again the public health hypo-
thetical case discussed above. The government might argue that the
incarceration of all individuals engaging in premarital sex is necessary
to protect the public health, even though much of the conduct is harm-
less, because many sick individuals are unaware of their illness until
they have communicated it to many partners. Tailoring the prohibi-
tion (and hence incarceration) to the sick individuals, in other words,
would not deter those mistakenly believing themselves to be healthy.
A similar argument was made in defense of an employer's fetal
protection policy excluding all fertile women from positions that could
expose them to lead levels deemed harmful to fetuses.199 Judge Pos-
ner argued in his dissenting opinion at the Court of Appeals that
"there are many careless pregnancies, as is shown by the frequency of
abortion and of illegitimate birth."200 Accordingly, many women
would work in a lead-contaminated atmosphere and become pregnant
without having planned the pregnancies and therefore without being
immediately aware of their pregnancies. Thus, warning pregnant
women or excluding pregnant women alone would be inadequate to
protect the fetus from lead.
Although this argument was made in the context of an employ-
ment discrimination action rather than a constitutional challenge, the
logic is quite similar. A less restrictive alternative would not do the
job of protecting the fetus, even though it might provide a better theo-
retical fit with the interest in fetal protection. The Supreme Court
held that fetal protection did not constitute a Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification under Title V11201 and the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act 20 2 and that the policy therefore constituted illegal pregnancy-
199 See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 876-77 (7th
Cir. 1989).
200 Id. at 906 (Posner, J., dissenting). For a more complete discussion of the implications
of Judge Posner's attitude toward women as reflected in this dissenting opinion, see Sherry
F. Colb, Words That Deny, Devalue, and Punish: Judicial Responses to Fetus-Envy?, 72
B.U. L. Rev. 101, 135-38 (1992) (criticizing Judge Posner's dissent on many counts, includ-
ing his failure to treat normal female life as the norm and his characterization of woman
and her fetus as two separate beings).
201 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988).
2M Id. § 2000e(k).
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based discrimination.20 3 The Court, therefore, did not have occasion
to evaluate Judge Posner's argument, which assumed that an employer
has a legitimate interest in protecting its employees' fetuses.
The ffipside of the empirical defense articulated above is the sec-
ond kind of overinclusiveness attack on a statute calling for incarcera-
tion. Such an attack would consist of the following argument: to
address the compelling interest articulated, one need not deprive any-
one of her fundamental right to liberty from confinement; one might
utilize a method that does not affect the individual's fundamental
rights. Just as the abstract overinclusiveness of a statute might be con-
stitutionally justified by the concrete necessity of extending its scope,
the abstract "fit" between the compelling interest and rights depriva-
tion might be constitutionally inadequate, because using a different
means could do the job equally well. In the context of our public
health example, such an argument would attack even the imprison-
ment of only those people engaging in premarital sex who are them-
selves diseased, on the theory that a fine would be a less restrictive
means of achieving the same compelling goal.
This highly empirical aspect of the overinclusiveness inquiry is
very problematic. Although fines are available as a less restrictive al-
ternative to prison,2° the threat of a fine may not be sufficient to de-
ter antisocial behavior. Since the threat of prison itself has not come
close to creating a crime-free United States,205 one might legitimately
wonder whether it might be unwise and even dangerous to substitute
the lesser threat of a monetary sanction for that of imprisonment.2°6
203 See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 (1991),
rev'g, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989). For an elaboration of the need for employers to accom-
modate both fetal safety and equal treatment of women in the workplace, see Colb, supra
note 200, at 135.
204 Although the eighth amendment forbids the imposition of "excessive fines," U.S.
Const. amend. VIII ("nor excessive fines imposed"); see, e.g., Austin v. United States, 113
S. Ct. 2801,2803 (1993) (applying eighth amendment's excessive fines clause to in rem civil
forfeiture proceedings), it is unlikely that a fine deemed necessary to serve a compelling
interest (in place of prison), would be found "excessive" for purposes of the eighth
amendment.
205 Indeed, according to Professor John J. Dilulio, Jr. of Princeton University and the
Brookings Institution, as reported by A.M. Rosenthal, the crime rate has been rising stead-
ily over the last several decades. The crime rate (number of property and violent crimes
per 100,000 people) was 190 in 1960, 400 in 1970, and approximately 600 in the 1990s.
A.M. Rosenthal, Crime in America: Prison Saves Lives, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1994, at A27.
After an in-depth study of crime and punishment in America, Lawrence M. Friedman con-
cluded that although imprisonment and the death penalty must have some deterrent effect
on behavior, "[i]t is pretty certain that it is less than most people think; the constant clamor
for more prisons, more executions, more police, assumes a potency that is almost surely a
delusion." Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History 14 (1993).
206 The problem with the use of fines is that many may view fines as de facto licensing
fees for criminal activity. The impact of such a "tax on crime," while likely to include some
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It is arguable that using less restrictive alternatives to prison to ad-
dress serious crime would likely result in an even higher crime rate.
Most of the time, there will not be data from which one could infer the
relative deterrence rates of different penalties, and therefore courts
would be left to judge competing legislative speculations about de-
grees of deterrence. 20 7
In order to avoid the difficulty of this type of inquiry, the Court
could treat incarceration as it treats deprivations of other fundamental
rights. For example, when the Court examines the constitutionality of
a burden on speech, it posits that the law will be effective in its literal
objective and determines only if its objective coincides conceptually
with the purported compelling state interest.208 The case of R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul20 9 provides a good illustration. In R.A.V., the
Supreme Court found that a city ordinance prohibiting bias-motivated
fighting words constituted discrimination against ideas based on their
content and viewpoint.210 In response to the city's argument that such
content- and viewpoint-based discrimination survives strict scrutiny
because "it is narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests....
[in helping] to ensure the basic human rights of members of groups
that have historically been subjected to discrimination[,] ' '2 1 the Court
stated:
We do not doubt that these interests are compelling, and that the
ordinance can be said to promote them. But the "danger of censor-
ship" presented by a facially content-based statute requires that that
weapon be employed only where it is "necessary to serve the as-
serted [compelling] interest." The existence of adequate content-
neutral alternatives thus "undercut[s] significantly" any defense of
such a statute, casting considerable doubt on the government's
protestations that "the asserted justification is in fact an accurate
level of deterrence, will not approach that of imprisonment. For example, an individual
might decide that killing his enemy is valuable enough to him to make a fine of $10,000 a
reasonable price. When imprisonment is an option, however, people who proceed in spite
of the available penalty are probably assuming that they will not get caught rather than
viewing imprisonment as an acceptable cost of their activity.
207 Given the crime rate in the United States, it would be counterfactual to assume that
any measure would completely eliminate any given crime. The issue is the effectiveness of
an alternative to incarceration as a deterrent.
208 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
118-23 (1991) (explaining that although preventing criminals from profiting from their
crimes is compelling interest, law providing for forfeiture of book royalties, on the assump-
tion that royalties will be successfully attached by the Crime Victims Board, is not narrowly
tailored to interest because its scope extends beyond those cases in which criminals are
profiting from their offenses).
209 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
210 Id. at 2547.
211 Id. at 2549.
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description of the purpose and effect of the law." The dispositive
question in this case, therefore, is whether content discrimination is
reasonably necessary to achieve St. Paul's compelling interests; it
plainly is not. An ordinance not limited to the favored topics, for
example, would have precisely the same beneficial effect.2 12
This response indicates a refusal to embark on an empirical inves-
tigation of the actual effects of the legislation at issue. It can hardly be
"plain" that a law prohibiting all fighting words would, as an empirical
matter, have "precisely the same beneficial effect" as a law singling
out the type of fighting words that threaten the safety and security of
oppressed groups for protection. The question of which legislation
would better serve the compelling interest as an empirical matter is
one that could only be answered by resort to facts about the world. A
logical assessment of the alternative ordinances would be inadequate.
The Court, however, confined its analysis to the theoretical scope
of a law banning all fighting words, without attention to content, as
compared to a law banning only those fighiing words directed at op-
pressed groups. On the assumption that the respective bans on fight-
ing words would both effectively protect the minority groups, the
Court noted that the content-neutral ban would do so without impli-
cating the fundamental right against content-based censorship and
consequently found the St. Paul ordinance to be unconstitutional
under the first amendment.213
Taking R.A.V. as a model, the inquiry into overinclusiveness of
laws imposing imprisonment would generally resemble that under-
taken in the areas of other fundamental fights and would accordingly
analyze the conceptual fit between imprisonment and the compelling
interest purportedly served. If the statute at issue allowed imprison-
ment for some conduct that did not implicate the compelling interest,
it would be presumptively overinclusive and invalid. Conversely, if
the statute allowed imprisonment of only those committing acts
that do implicate the compelling interest, it would presumptively
not be overinclusive and therefore would survive the overinclusive-
ness component of the compelling interest test. If very strong
evidence could be assembled in defense of either the need for
imprisoning more individuals or the equal or greater efficacy of
a less restrictive penalty than prison for a particular crime,214 then
212 Id. at 2549-50 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
213 Id. at 2550.
214 One example of this might be studies demonstrating that chemical castration of con-
victed rapists is more effective in protecting the public from recidivism than is imprison-
ment. Of course, the eighth amendment issue of whether such a measure constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment would have to be addressed and would necessarily inform the
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the presumption in favor of the conceptual approach might be
rebutted.215
One final issue that might arise in connection with the overinclu-
siveness inquiry is the length of a prison sentence. One might argue,
in connection with a particular prison sentence, that it would be possi-
ble to serve the compelling governmental interest with a shorter sen-
tence. In other words, (X minus D) years in prison may be a
constitutionally required less restrictive alternative to X years in
prison because it deprives the individual of less freedom from incar-
ceration and would be equally effective in serving the proffered com-
pelling interest. This argument is flawed.
For a sentence of any length, one could argue that a day less in
prison would not substantially reduce deterrence, restraint, or retribu-
tion, and that the actual sentence is therefore unconstitutionally over-
inclusive. The same argument, however, could then be used to
challenge the new, one-day-shorter sentence, and so on. This day-by-
day analysis of the length of a prison sentence results in an absurd
outcome: the conclusion that no finite prison sentence can survive
strict scrutiny.216 Such an outcome would be both impractical and in-
supportable from the perspective of the need to control serious antiso-
cial conduct.
meaning of "alternatives" in the class of less restrictive alternatives. Although the funda-
mental right to procreate would be implicated, to the extent that such deprivation would
be more effective than the deprivation of the right against liberty from confinement, it
would seem that the compelling interest test would be satisfied with respect to the right to
procreate.
215 Cf. Sherry F. Colb, Assuming Facts Not in Evidence: A Response to Russell M.
Coombs, Reforming New Jersey Evidence Law on Fresh Complaint of Rape, 25 Rutgers
L.J. 745 (1994) (arguing, in context of evidence of delay in reporting rape, that relevance of
delay may no longer be determined solely by resort to commonsense intuitions when
strong empirical evidence has been assembled that rebuts those intuitions). One example
of such rebuttal is evident in Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992), in which the
Supreme Court scrutinized a mandated electioneering-free zone around polling places. Id.
at 1848. The Court discussed historical facts about persistent voter intimidation and elec-
tion fraud and the effects of various legislative responses to these problems, see id. at 1852-
55, and determined that "this wide-spread and time-tested consensus [among the States]
demonstrates that some restricted zone is necessary in order to serve the States' compel-
ling interest in preventing voter intimidation and election fraud," id. at 1855.
216 This analysis calls to mind the riddle about the impossibility of giving a surprise quiz.
The riddle goes as follows: A teacher announces on Monday that there will be a surprise
quiz one day that week. What day will it be? It cannot be Friday, because once Friday
came, the students would know it has to be Friday and it therefore would not be a surprise.
It cannot be Thursday, because since it cannot be Friday, the students would know on
Thursday that it has to be that day and it therefore would not be a surprise, and so on until
Monday. While every step makes sense, the outcome-that the surprise quiz is impossible
once announced-is nonsense.
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The case of Burson v. Freeman217 confronts a similar puzzle in the
context of the first amendment. A political party worker challenged a
Tennessee statute prohibiting solicitation of votes and display of cam-
paign materials within one hundred feet of the entrance to a polling
place on election day. The Supreme Court determined that "[a]s a
facially content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum,
[the statute] must be subjected to exacting scrutiny: The State must
show that the 'regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state inter-
est and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."' 218 The state
claimed its regulation was aimed at protecting both the citizens' free-
dom in voting for the candidates of their choice and the right to vote
in an election conducted with integrity and reliability.219 After recog-
nizing that the asserted interests were indeed compelling,2 0 the Court
turned to the narrow tailoring aspect of strict scrutiny.
The Court stated that "[w]hile we readily acknowledge that a law
rarely survives such scrutiny, an examination of the evolution of elec-
tion reform, both in this country and abroad, demonstrates the neces-
sity of restricted areas in or around polling places."2' Nevertheless,
the question of how large a restricted zone would be legitimate re-
mained. The Court determined that one hundred feet was not overly
burdensome.222 It asserted that "[r]educing the boundary to 25 feet,
as suggested by the Tennessee Supreme Court, is a difference only in
degree, not a less restrictive alternative in kind."2 3
Similarly, small reductions in prison sentences should not be
viewed as constitutionally mandated, less restrictive alternatives. A
harder question is presented, however, when long prison sentences,
that therefore could be made significantly shorter, are at issue.
Should the state have to demonstrate that something far short of life
imprisonment, for example, would not serve the state's proffered com-
pelling interest equally well? Although courts might accept an affirm-
217 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992).
218 Id. at 1851 (quoting Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 45 (1983)).
219 Id. at 1851.
220 Id. at 1851-52.
221 Id. at 1852.
222 Id. at 1857.
223 Id. (citation omitted). The Court further developed the boundaries of the allowable
speech-free zone under the first amendment in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 114
S. Ct. 2516, 2525 (1994) (upholding, under heightened, but not strict, scrutiny, portions of
injunction establishing 36-foot buffer zone on public street surrounding abortion clinic
from which demonstrators were excluded, but striking down portion of injunction applied
to demonstrators on private property within 36 feet of clinic and striking down 300-foot
zone established around clinic in which protesters could not approach patients and poten-
tial patients who did not consent to talk).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 69:781
HeinOnline -- 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 834 1994
FREEDOM FROM INCARCERATION
ative response to this question, I would tentatively suggest that the
answer should be no.
First, as outlined above, even long prison terms have not success-
fully reduced the rate of serious crime to an acceptable level in the
United States.22 4 Therefore, the notion that prison sentences are un-
necessarily long, that they could be much shorter and still serve the
government's interest in controlling serious criminal activity, is not
very convincing. Second, when a court determines that an individual's
conduct has undermined or subverted a compelling state interest, that
determination arguably introduces an additional compelling state in-
terest into the picture: the interest in retribution.
Quite apart from the specific and general deterrent effect of long
sentences on crime rates, many believe that justice requires that seri-
ous crimes be punished.225 If a crime is not serious, then a person who
commits that crime should not lose her liberty from incarceration at
all. But if a court determines that an offense is serious enough to im-
plicate a compelling state interest, it may very well follow that society
has a further compelling interest in punishing anyone who commits
that crime.
Once a court recognizes that a crime is serious enough to justify
imprisonment, the question of how long a sentence can be before it
exceeds that length necessary to serve the compelling interest in retri-
bution is very different from the usual question that arises in overin-
clusiveness analysis. Instead of calculating how to accomplish a
definable goal, the retribution question requires a legislator or judge
to quantify the degree of moral outrage accompanying a given offense
and respond appropriately to that outrage. The cases elaborating the
meaning of narrow tailoring do not make clear how one would quan-
tify the amount of prison time "necessary" to serve the compelling
interest in retribution. The Supreme Court has refused, in its eighth
224 See note 205 supra.
= Such a belief explains why the Simon Wiesenthal Center continues to search for Nazi
war criminals, in an effort to bring them to justice, in spite of the fact that few remain alive,
that those who continue to live are unlikely to repeat their crimes, and that current and
future genocide is unlikely to be affected by whether a handful of Nazi war criminals are
successfully tried and punished. The moral position underlying the search is that the vic-
tims of such crimes have an interest in having those responsible for their suffering held
accountable. See Simon Wiesenthal Center, The Eastern Office of the Simon Wiesenthal
Center 4 (1993) (explaining that Wiesenthal legacy includes mission of documenting crimes
of genocide that took place during Holocaust and bringing those responsible to justice) (on
file with the New York University Law Review). Lord Owen, international mediator of
the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, has said that "[tihere can be no amnesty for war
criminals," and that "the moral order of this world is marred if those who are guilty of war
crimes are not brought to justice." Quoted in Anthony Lewis, 'The Civilized World', N.Y.
Times, July 1, 1994, at A25.
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amendment jurisprudence, to second guess states' determinations of
the appropriate length of prison sentences.226 I would accordingly (al-
beit tentatively) suggest that courts leave the issue of sentence length
out of the overinclusiveness inquiry, once it is determined that some
prison term for the relevant conduct would otherwise satisfy the de-
mands of strict scrutiny.
b. Underinclusiveness. The second requirement of narrow tai-
loring is that a law infringing upon a fundamental right not be under-
inclusive. This requirement means that the law must extend equally to
the various situations in which the compelling interest advanced by
the government is implicated rather than extending only to a limited
subset of such situations. A classic example of an underinclusive law
is one that purports to serve a compelling interest in addressing a
problem that has nothing to do with speech, but deals with the prob-
lem only when it manifests itself in terms of a particular message or
viewpoint. Justice Blackmun noted in his concurrence in Simon &
Schuster, for instance, that the Son of Sam law was underinclusive,
presumably in serving the compelling interest in compensating victims
from the fruits of crime.227 The only criminal gains that would be for-
feited by virtue of the law would be gains derived from speech about
crime. The underinclusive statute is selective and does not adequately
serve the proffered compelling state interest.
The requirement that a law frustrating the exercise of a funda-
mental right not be underinclusive ensures that the government is
truly serving its claimed compelling state interest rather than another
interest that is less important or even illegitimate. In City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co. ,228 for example, Justice O'Connor described
the importance of applying strict scrutiny to legislation utilizing sus-
pect classifications as a means of "'smok[ing] out' illegitimate uses of
race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important
enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool."229 Justice O'Connor
went on to explain that strict scrutiny "ensures that the means chosen
'fit' this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility
226 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95 (1991) (holding that life sen-
tence without possibility of parole for cocaine possession was not cruel and unusual pun-
ishment); see also note 55 supra. By noting the Supreme Court's approach, I do not
endorse its position that the ban on cruel and unusual punishments does not contain a
proportionality requirement. The eighth amendment would indeed appear to be the most
appropriate vehicle for making a moral judgment about how much retribution is too much.
227 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123-24
(1991) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
228 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
229 Id. at 493.
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that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice
or stereotype."'' 30 The underinclusiveness prong of strict scrutiny thus
exposes pretextual invocations of a compelling state interest by re-
vealing when the state has neglected areas in which an authentic con-
cern about this interest would have dictated further legislation.
Beyond uncovering those occasions when the government does
not consider the proffered interest to be compelling enough to pursue
thoroughly, the underinclusiveness inquiry ensures that citizens are
not treated unequally in their exercise of fundamental rights without
good reason. The compelling interest provides the good reason, both
for depriving some individuals of their fundamental rights and for pro-
viding differential access to such rights, but it only "works" if the legis-
lation coincides with the compelling interest and all of its
manifestations.
In the context of fundamental rights analysis, the underinclusive-
ness inquiry is doctrinally indistinguishable from the equal protection
fundamental rights inquiry. To understand this identity, consider a
case discussed earlier in this Article, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Wil-
liamson.- 1 The law challenged in Skinner triggered the application of
strict scrutiny, because it deprived some but not all criminals of the
fundamental right to procreateP232 Finding no compelling interest jus-
tifying the distinction between the different kinds of criminals, the
Court struck down the Oklahoma statute.233 Had the Court con-
ducted an underinclusiveness inquiry as part of fundamental rights
analysis (as opposed to equal protection fundamental rights analysis),
it would have noted that the state could not provide any compelling
interest that extended only to some but not to all the recidivist thieves
covered by the Oklahoma statute. In other words, whatever compel-
ling interest might be advanced (for example, in preventing theft)
could not be confined to the class of criminals to which Skinner
belonged.
Like the fundamental right to procreate at issue in Skinner, the
right to be free from physical confinement must not be denied differ-
entially unless the purported compelling interest coincides with the
boundaries of the denial. If one activity were punished by imprison-
ment while another were not, it would be necessary to explain the
distinction in terms of a compelling interest, presumably the same
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compelling interest that justified incarceration for the one act in the
first place.234
To see when underinclusiveness analysis might prove fatal, con-
sider the premarital sex example from above.235 Recall that the com-
pelling interest proffered in defense of a statute permitting
imprisonment of individuals who engage in premarital sex was the
need to prevent the spread of deadly diseases through sexual contact.
We determined that the statute would be presumptively overinclusive
(and therefore invalid) for reaching the conduct of those individuals
who are healthy and therefore do not implicate the compelling inter-
est in public health. We determined further that the state could rebut
this presumption with strong evidence that only the imprisonment of
all those engaging in premarital sex could actually prevent the spread
of disease through sexual contact. We turn now to the underinclusive-
ness potential of this hypothetical statute.
234 I refer here to cases that provide the incarceration analogue to Skinner, in which one
kind of activity is punished by imprisonment while a similar activity is not. Although one
might also take into account differences in length of incarceration in applying underinclu-
siveness analysis, I would favor an approach that did not scrutinize differences in length,
for some of the same reasons that I favored this approach for purposes of overinclusiveness
analysis. See text accompanying notes 216-26 supra. Small differences in sentence
length-in contrast to the difference between incarceration and no incarceration-are not
significant enough to require strict scrutiny, either in the context of comparing possible
sentences for one individual (overinclusiveness) or in the context of comparing different
sentences imposed upon different individuals (underinclusiveness). Greater differences in
sentence length would, in turn, reflect differential judgments about deterrence, the review
of which would require the kinds of subtle empirical determinations that have not normally
been a part of strict scrutiny. See text accompanying notes 216-26 supra.
If one were to decide to apply underinclusiveness analysis to prison sentences of dif-
ferent lengths, one consequence would be to subject the sentencing disparities between
offenses involving powder cocaine and those involving cocaine base (i.e., crack) to strict
scrutiny. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, an offense involving 200 to 300 grams of co-
caine is equivalent, for sentencing purposes, to the same offense involving between two
and three grams of cocaine base. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines
Manual, § 2D1.1(c)(10) (1994). Until now, federal courts of appeals have uniformly re-
jected constitutional challenges to this disparity. See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 24
F.3d 37, 38-39 (9th Cir.) (rejecting argument that disparate sentencing for crack and pow-
der cocaine constitutes racial discrimination, given disparate impact on black defendants,
because there is no evidence of racially discriminatory intent), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 261
(1994); United States v. Williams, 982 F.2d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1992) (reiterating position
that crack/powder cocaine disparity survives rational basis scrutiny, because crack is more
potent; more addictive, more affordable, and more prevalent); United States v. Harding,
971 F.2d 410, 414 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that distinction between crack and powder co-
caine does not, on its face, violate equal protection clause), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1025
(1993); United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1034 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that disparity in
sentences between crack and powder cocaine does not violate eighth amendment), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1091 (1991).
235 See text accompanying note 193 supra.
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The underinclusiveness question is: why is only premarital sex
punished with imprisonment? If the purpose of the statute is to pre-
vent the spread of disease, then all diseased individuals should be pun-
ished for having sex. The category of all diseased individuals could
theoretically include married as well as unmarried individuals, particu-
larly since some deadly diseases that are sexually transmitted can also
be contracted through avenues other than sexual intercourse. More-
over, if no married people are in fact diseased at any given time, then
a law extending to all diseased individuals would not apply to them for
that reason. There is no need, in other words, to create an exemption
for married people, if the compelling interest to be served is that in
preventing the spread of disease.
The statute is therefore unconstitutional. Its underinclusiveness
(exempting married persons) demonstrates that the statute is not truly
serving the concededly compelling interest in preventing the spread of
deadly disease. It is quite likely that the statute instead simply im-
poses the state's moral judgments about premarital sex upon its citi-
zens. The statute is also unconstitutional because it treats married
people differently from unmarried people with respect to the funda-
mental right to liberty from confinement without a compelling interest
to justify that disparate treatment.
B. What Counts as a Deprivation?
As with any fundamental right, the right to be free from physical
confinement is not self-defining and can be described as existing on a
continuum, along which lines must be drawn. Some individuals might
feel confined, for example, when they are forced to sit and figure out
how much tax they owe the federal government. Others might feel
confined when they must stop for a few moments at a red light or a
stop sign before driving into an intersection. No one would seriously
argue, however, that these slight burdens on one's freedom of move-
ment ought to trigger strict scrutiny as deprivations of liberty from
confinement. 36
A jurisprudence of liberty that extended strict scrutiny to the in-
stitution of stop signs3 7 -would resemble the Lochner 38 jurisprudence
236 See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 266-78 (1977) (arguing against general
right to "liberty," conceived as right to be free of all government regulation, but arguing
for recognition of specific, important "liberties").
237 1 assume here that the law requiring a vehicle to stop does not provide for prison as a
penalty for violation. If it did, then strict scrutiny would be appropriate because of the
prison penalty and not because the stop sign itself deprives the driver of her constitution-
ally protected liberty from confinement
238 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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of the early-twentieth-century, during which the Court closely scruti-
nized all legislation regulating private economic transactions.239 Short
of subjecting every law that in any way limits people's freedom to
heightened scrutiny, how do we decide when a deprivation is severe
enough to require justification by a compelling state interest?
The need to draw lines in designating the appropriate area for
application of strict scrutiny is not foreign to fundamental rights juris-
prudence. A case involving the right to marry provides one example
of how the Court has chosen to draw such lines. In Zablocki v.
Redhail,20 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
Wisconsin law providing that a noncustodial parent of minor children
to whom he must pay support under a court order or judgment may
not marry without court approval. The Court observed that "the right
to marry is part of the fundamental 'right of privacy' implicit in the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause."241 In deciding what
level of scrutiny to apply, the Court noted that "[s]ince our past deci-
sions make clear that the right to marry is of fundamental importance,
and since the classification at issue here significantly interferes with
the exercise of that right, we believe that 'critical examination' of the
state interests advanced in support of the classification is required. '242
When a law significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right, then, the law triggers strict scrutiny. The Court explained fur-
ther that
[b]y reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we
do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in
any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be
subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regula-
tions that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into
the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed.243
In other words, state action that does not significantly interfere with a
fundamental right need only be "reasonable," a requirement common
to all laws.244
239 The Court required a real and substantial relationship between statutes and their
purposes. See Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111 (1928); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56,
64; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905). For further discussion of the Loch-
ner line of cases, see L. l'ibe, supra note 13, §§ 8-3 to -7, at 568-586 (discussing develop-
ment and philosophy of Lochner style "strict and skeptical means-ends analysis").
240 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
241 Id. at 384.
242 Id. at 383 (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 314
(1976)).
243 Id. at 386.
2A See note 47 supra.
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The line the Court draws would be equally appropriate in the
case of the right to liberty from confinement. Any civil or criminal
law requiring that citizens act or refrain from acting in a particular
way will limit freedom to some extent. Such limits do iot rise to the
level of a deprivation of liberty from confinement, however, unless
they are significant or substantial. A significant deprivation of liberty
from confinement would necessarily include both a spatial and a tem-
poral component. A public street may be closed for repairs for
months, but the degree to which that limits freedom of movement is
slight. Citizens may go anywhere on public property other than that
street. It would therefore be false to say that they are physically con-
fined. Similarly, an eye-witness to a traffic accident who is called to
the police station to describe the accident is confined to a small space
(the station house), but only for the brief period of time it takes to
recount the events surrounding the accident. On the other hand,
when both the temporal and the spatial components of liberty from
confinement implicated by a law are substantial, there is a deprivation
of liberty from confinement.
When we consider easy cases, the importance of time and space
in examining the nature of a deprivation is apparent. A sentence of a
month in jail is indisputably a deprivation of liberty from confinement.
A prisoner cannot go on any public street or park but must stay within
the bounds of the jail. The time involved is also significant. A month
in confinement is not an hour-long interview with a police officer or a
stop at a traffic light. In order to place a person in jail for a month,
the state must have a compelling interest that necessitates such
confinement.
We have examined some easy cases in which the deprivations are
either so temporally or spatially minimal that they cannot possibly be
described as significantly interfering with liberty from confinement or
so great that they must be so described. Though ultimately courts will
be left to resolve the hard cases, we shall briefly consider how some of
these might be addressed.
First, consider pretrial detention of criminal suspects. We know
that restrictions on movement far short of imprisonment qualify as
"seizures" of the person for fourth amendment purposes and there-
fore require some justification.245 A brief "stop" by police, however,
245 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (explaining that "whenever a police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person").
By justification, I mean some level of suspicion that criminal activity is or has been taking
place. Justification in the procedural area rarely involves substantive scrutiny of the crimi-
nal law being enforced. But see Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (holding that
fourth amendment prohibits use of deadly force against fleeing suspect unless it is neces-
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requires less in the way of justification than does an arrest, even
though both intrusions are considered seizures.246 In contrast to this
procedural protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, the
application of strict scrutiny to restrictions placed on fundamental
rights appears to be an on/off proposition.24 7 Judges would therefore
need to decide whether this feature of fundamental rights jurispru-
dence would be extended to the right to liberty from confinement. If
not, they would have to consider whether several discrete levels of
scrutiny or a sliding scale would be appropriate and how the various
intrusions would be ordered along the continuum.248
Stops by the police and pretrial custodial detention are the two
main pretrial encroachments upon liberty that would have to be con-
fronted. Brief stops by the police do not significantly intrude upon
one's liberty from confinement from a temporal perspective and
should therefore not require a compelling interest.249 Accordingly,
stopping an individual to question her about an offense in the enforce-
sary to prevent escape and officer has probable cause to believe suspect poses risk of death
or substantial bodily harm; the latter condition is satisfied if there is probable cause to
believe suspect has committed violent crime).
246 Compare Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-23 (requiring reasonable suspicion for a stop) with
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (requiring probable cause for an
arrest).
247 But see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (requiring lesser level
of scrutiny for burdens on speech mixed with conduct that are intended to advance a pur-
pose unrelated to suppression of free expression).
248 In the equal protection context, there are three tiers of scrutiny. Most legal distinc-
tions need only meet rational basis scrutiny. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) (upholding ban on plastic milk containers as rationally re-
lated to state's legitimate environmental goals). Other distinctions, including those based
upon gender and illegitimacy, require intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,724 (1982) (requiring that policy excluding men from state
nursing school be "substantially related" to "important governmental objectives"); Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982) (requiring that illegitimacy-based classifications be "sub-
stantially related" to legitimate state interest). Still others, including distinctions based
upon race, require strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (find-
ing that antimiscegenation law did not survive strict scrutiny). Justice Stevens has sug-
gested that equal protection scrutiny exists along a continuum, rather than occupying three
discrete tiers. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,451 (1985)
(Stevens, J., concurring); see also Note, Justice Stevens' Equal Protection Jurisprudence,
100 Harv. L. Rev. 1146, 1146 (1987) (discussing Justice Stevens' "separate vision" of equal
protection).
249 The fact that such a stop would require reasonable suspicion under the fourth
amendment because it qualifies as a seizure does not, of course, dictate its treatment as a
substantive due process right. See notes 123-28 and accompanying text supra. Similarly,
the fact that a stop qualifies as a "seizure" under the fourth amendment does not render
interrogation that takes place during such a stop "custodial" for purposes of Miranda. See
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (explaining that "comparatively non-
threatening character" of Terry stops remove them from dictates of Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
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ment of which there is no compelling interest would not violate sub-
stantive due process. Pretrial incarceration in a jail cell, by contrast, is
significant both temporally and spatially and should accordingly re-
quire justification by a compelling interest. This interest would ordi-
narily be the same compelling interest that would justify incarceration
as a penalty for the offense for which the suspect is arrested.
The Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Salerno 50 pro-
vides a useful example of what strict scrutiny of pretrial detention
might include. The case involved the question of whether a suspect
may constitutionally be held in custody prior to trial if she poses an
identifiable and articulable threat to individuals or to the commu-
nity.251 In upholding the Bail Reform Act of 1984,52 which provided
for such detention, the Court emphasized the fact that the law "care-
fully limits the circumstances under which detention may be sought to
the most serious of crimes."' 253 Such crimes included "crimes of vio-
lence, offenses for which the sentence is life imprisonment or death,
[and] serious drug offenses."5 4 In defending the constitutionality of
pretrial detention, the Court explained that in various areas, "we have
found that sufficiently compelling governmental interests can justify
detention of dangerous persons. ' 255 Once again implying the need for
a compelling interest, the Court added that "[t]he government's inter-
est in preventing crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compel-
ing.'"2 5 6 And finally, in approving the statute, the Court focused on
the statute's guarantee of an individualized determination that no less
restrictive alternative to incarceration exists: "[I]n a full-blown adver-
sary hearing, the Government must convince a neutral decisionmaker
by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release can
reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person. ' '2.7
Such an individualized determination of narrow tailoring is not re-
quired in the case of any other fundamental right and may not be
250 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
251 Id. at 751.
252 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
253 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 748.
256 Id. at 749. Of course, the notion that preventing "crime" is compelling without re-
gard to the substance of the crime is deeply flawed; this notion accounts for the Court's
failure to treat liberty from confinement as a fundamental right in the context of the crimi-
nal law. However, the Court's decision to use the language of the compelling interest test
in addressing the deprivation of liberty from confinement outside the context of the "valid
conviction rule" reveals the fundamental nature of the right, notwithstanding the Court's
failure to understand that crime-fighting in the abstract cannot, without more, constitute an
inherently compelling state interest.
257 Id. at 750.
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necessary in this context either. The Court's approach in Salerno is
useful, however, in helping us envision the process of strict scrutiny
that would appropriately accompany deprivations of liberty from con-
finement at the pretrial stage.
Courts would also need to address lesser restrictions upon liberty
than prison that are imposed after conviction. Sentencing individuals
to probation or supervised release and requiring them to meet with a
probation officer on a regular basis are closer to a brief stop or sta-
tion-house interview than to imprisonment. Full-time community ser-
vice might be a closer case. Since most people must work in order to
obtain food and shelter, however, such a requirement would probably
not rise to the level of a significant deprivation of liberty from con-
finement. House-arrest, yet another penalty that falls short of actual
imprisonment, would probably be classified on the significant depriva-
tion side of the line, although a sliding-scale approach would provide
less scrutiny for house-arrest than for an actual prison sentence. Any
particular decision to place a marginal case on one or the other side of
the line might seem arbitrary; however, that arbitrariness should not
obscure the ease with which the most common cases may be catego-
rized, nor should it be viewed as unique to liberty from incarceration.
Every right must have a boundary, and the boundary of a right, like
the border of a nation, is always the most vulnerable to attack.
C. Practical Difficulties and Some Tentative Solutions
The most complex practical issue that will arise if courts adopt the
compelling interest test for deprivations of the fundamental right to
liberty from confinement is this: how much civil disobedience will be
tolerated? In other words, under what circumstances may a citizen
decide on her own that the state lacks a compelling interest that would
justify confinement for specified conduct and accordingly engage in
the conduct and later challenge the constitutionality of the confine-
ment? Traditionally, a citizen has been permitted to violate an uncon-
stitutional law and later cite the invalidity of the law as a defense in a
criminal proceeding. Indeed, even in a habeas corpus proceeding,
when federal courts normally may not announce or apply new consti-
tutional rules granting relief to a petitioner,258 there is an exception
that applies when the new rule involves the announcement that the
primary conduct criminalized by the law is itself constitutionally pro-
258 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that Court
will not announce new rules in habeas corpus proceedings); see also Butler v. McKellar,
494 U.S. 407, 412-14 (1990) (majority reaffirming Teague).
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tected.2 s 9 This "primary conduct" exception, moreover, has been ex-
tended to cases in which the petitioner's punishment is
unconstitutional2 60 Therefore, when a criminal statute commands a
citizen to act or refrain from acting, the citizen may ignore the law and
avoid imprisonment if the statute is ultimately invalidated. This ap-
proach, like the primary conduct exception to the Court's nonretroac-
tivity principle in habeas corpus cases, should be extended to cases in
which the unconstitutionality of the criminal statute rests upon its im-
position of incarceration rather than upon its prohibition of constitu-
tionally protected conduct.261
The more difficult questions arise when the source of the com-
mand is not a statute but a police officer or judge. The situation in-
volving a police officer's command was arguably addressed in
Michigan v. DeFillipo.262 In DeFillipo, the Court held that when the
police arrest a person for violating a statute that is ultimately invali-
dated, evidence seized during a search incident to that arrest is not
rendered inadmissible by virtue of the fact that the police were enforc-
ing an unconstitutional law. The Court explained that at the time of
the arrest,
there was no controlling precedent that this ordinance was or was
not constitutional .... A prudent officer... should not have been
required to anticipate that a court would later hold the ordinance
unconstitutional.
Police are charged to enforce laws until and unless they are de-
clared unconstitutional.... Society would be in-served if its police
officers took it upon themselves to determine which laws are and
which are not constitutionally entitled to enforcement3263
Extending this principle to arrests for violations of laws that are
ultimately held not to serve a compelling interest, the police officer
involved cannot be expected (and perhaps should not even be al-
lowed) to decide what governmental interests are and are not compel-
259 See Butler, 494 U.S. at 415 (explaining exception for protected primary conduct);
Teague, 489 U.S. at 307, 311 (same).
260 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329-30 (1989) (finding that first Teague excep-
tion would apply in case requiring announcement of new rule regarding constitutionality of
executing mentally retarded person convicted of murder).
261 Of course, where the challenge is to the constitutionality of imprisonment, rather
than the constitutionality of the underlying prohibition, the petitioner would not be privi-
leged to engage in the prohibited activity without suffering any consequences. In other
words, unlike a holding that prohibiting marijuana use is unconstitutional, a holding that
imprisoning those who use marijuana is unconstitutional would still leave open alternative
punishments, punishments that do not violate a fundamental right, for the individual who
smoked marijuana.
262 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
2 Id. at 37-38.
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ling.264 Accordingly, the officer should have the authority to arrest
people for violating the criminal law, even though there is a possibility
that the consequent pretrial detention may turn out to be unconstitu-
tional. Once a petitioner establishes that incarceration for a given of-
fense is unconstitutional, the police would then lose the authority to
arrest individuals for such a crime. An individual planning to commit
a given offense might bring a declaratory judgment action, in which he
would have to show only a reasonable probability of arrest.265
The threat of incarceration for failure to comply with judicial or-
ders presents additional concerns. These concerns arise whenever a
court uses its contempt power. There are two kinds of contempt, civil
and criminal. In the case of civil contempt, an individual has dis-
obeyed an order of the court, typically an order given in the context of
civil litigation, and any incarceration "is intended to force [the] defen-
dant into doing what he was ordered to do.'2a66 When the individual
subject to the contempt order is a party to the relevant litigation, she
may not appeal the order until there is a final judgment in the ac-
tion.267 Like an individual who is arrested by the police, an individual
incarcerated for civil contempt may only challenge the constitutional-
ity of the incarceration at a later point. Also, as in the case of arrest,
once the unconstitutionality of incarceration for a particular contempt
is established, judges would be bound by that precedent in subsequent
cases.
The second kind of contempt, criminal contempt, is a willful dis-
regard of the court's authority. The purpose of a criminal contempt
proceeding is to "vindicate the authority of the court and to deter sim-
ilar derelictions" in the future.268 Unlike in the case of civil contempt,
a person who is punished by incarceration for criminal contempt does
264 One could imagine, for example, that some police officers might decide not to arrest
individuals for domestic violence, on the theory that there is no compelling interest at
stake. Cf. Beverly Balos & Mary L. Fellows, Law and Violence Against Women: Cases
and Materials on Systems of Oppression 227 (1994) (describing lawsuits filed against vari-
ous police departments during 1970s that arose from failure of police to enforce laws
against domestic violence and to respond to calls from battered women). Such nonen-
forcement should be disciplined rather than encouraged.
265 Michael Hardwick, for example, would have been able to seek a declaratory judg-
ment action before he was actually arrested under such a regime, because the injury com-
plained of would become the pretrial detention itself, not merely the threat of future
prosecution.
266 11 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil
§ 2960, at 585 (1973).
267 3 Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 715, at 868
(1982); see Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105, 107 (1936) (citing as settled law that "except in
connection with an appeal from a final judgment or decree, a party to a suit may not review
upon appeal an order fining or imprisoning him for the commission of a civil contempt").
268 C. Wright, supra note 267, § 702, at 809.
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not hold the "keys to his prison,"269 and therefore cannot end the im-
prisonment by complying with the original court order.270 Criminal
contempt is divided into direct and indirect contempts, distinguished
by whether the contumacious conduct took place in the presence of
the judge.271 If an individual is tried for criminal contempt, the argu-
ment that the order was unconstitutional will not bar criminal punish-
ment, unless there was no opportunity for effective review of the
decree.272 This principle naturally extends to an order that serves no
compelling interest and therefore cannot constitutionally be enforced
through incarceration.
-An important question arises in the contempt context: what hap-
pens if an individual is sued and ultimately ordered to do something in
which the government has no compelling interest, and the individual
refuses to comply with the order? Consider the following example.
The state of Ames passes a law providing a cause of action for dam-
ages to individuals who witness public displays of affection. The law
does not itself provide for incarceration, so it may perhaps be justified
on the ground that many people find public kissing offensive, and it is
legitimate to accommodate that preference. Assume that John Doe
kisses Jane Roe in public, and Joe Smith witnesses the event and sues
the couple under the Ames statute. When Joe prevails and is unable
to collect damages from John and Jane, he sues on the judgment, and
the court orders John and Jane to pay or be held in contempt. May
they be placed in jail until they agree to pay, or may they be incarcer-
ated as a punishment for their failure to obey the order and pay, even
though there is no compelling interest in preventing public kissing?
This is a difficult case, and one could mobilize a defense of either
an affirmative or a negative response. A defense of the affirmative
269 See id. § 704, at 826.
270 The Supreme Court has recently further developed the distinction between civil and
criminal contempt. In International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell,
114 S. Ct. 2552 (1994), the Court explained that "[c]ontempts involving out-of-court diso-
bedience to complex injunctions often require elaborate and reliable factfinding," id. at
2560, and held that in that particular case, in which a contempt fine was imposed on the
union for "widespread, ongoing, out-of-court violations of a complex injunction," the con-
tempt should be considered criminal and therefore subject to criminal procedural protec-
tions such as the jury trial right, id. at 2562.
271 See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New Ap-
proach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1025, 1030 (1993) (examin-
ing criticisms of contempt process).
272 See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 317-18 (1967) (I[T]he way to raise
[a constitutional challenge to a temporary injunction] was to apply to the [state] courts to
have the injunction modified or dissolved .... This case would arise in quite a different
constitutional posture if the petitioners, before disobeying the injunction, had challenged it
in the [state] courts, and had been met with delay or frustration of their constitutional
claims.").
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answer might assert that although there is no compelling governmen-
tal interest in preventing public kissing, more is at stake than the par-
ticular conduct proscribed by the law. A judge has ordered an
individual to do something, and the individual has defied the court.
Unlike the legislature, which does not engage in direct confrontations
with citizens, one could argue that "[w]ithout the authority to force
compliance with their orders, courts would be merely advisory and
could not function." 273 Therefore, the compelling interest at stake is
the interest in vindicating the authority of the court rather than the
interest in preventing public kissing. The court would certainly be un-
able to function if people could ignore its orders with impunity.
The response to this argument, however, is that it may prove too
much. If the compelling nature of a court order can rest on the need
for judicial authority generally, then the compelling nature of a partic-
ular law might rest on the need for obedience to the legislature gener-
ally. This latter argument would lead to the absurd conclusion that no
law is unconstitutional, because there is a compelling interest in the
law that justifies every law. The latter proposition cannot be true, so
we must judge particular statutes and particular court orders on their
own merits.
This response does not seem satisfactory. Disobeying a judge is a
threat to society, a threat independent of what the judge has ordered,
in a way that is not true in the case of disobeying the legislature. One
might analogize the importance of obeying a court's orders to the
value placed on testifying truthfully and not obstructing justice; this
value is independent of the content of the particular proceeding. It is
also the case that once John Doe and Jane Roe are adjudicated as
owing money to Joe Smith, the compelling interest at stake may well
be to give Joe Smith the money that now rightfully belongs to him, the
same interest that the government would have in preventing theft, for
example. The failure of the defendants to pay after being ordered to
do so also automatically satisfies the least restrictive alternative prong
of the compelling interest test.
If courts adjudicate cases and controversies that do not them-
selves involve compelling interests, a strong argument exists that there
is still a compelling interest in allowing the court to function effec-
tively. Thus, the Supreme Court spoke convincingly when it asserted
that "[t]he power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its
existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceed-
273 Richard E. Labunski, The "Collateral Bar" Rule and the First Amendment: The
Constitutionality of Enforcing Unconstitutional Orders, 37 Am. U. L. Rev. 323,324 (1988).
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ings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the
courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice."274
CONCLUSION
When we speak of justice, we often mean to describe the harsh
and punishing side of the law. Justice consists of holding individuals
accountable for their actions, of protecting society from harmful indi-
viduals, and of ensuring that societal outrage is given expression with-
out resort to self-help. Justice is a worthy pursuit, and no government
need apologize for making it the highest priority.
We must ask ourselves, however, what it is we are punishing
when we allow the incarceration of any and all criminals. The fact
that conduct is prohibited by the criminal law does not reveal very
much about the conduct, because the enactment of criminal legislation
is no different, involves no more rigorous or demanding a process,
than the enactment of noncriminal legislation. Because the legislative
process is no more rigorous, the process of judicial review should be.
The right to be free from physical confinement is, and ought to enjoy
the status of, a fundamental right. Procedural due process cannot be a
surrogate for substance, and imprisonment therefore must be justified
not only by a valid conviction, but by a valid law. Such a law must
only deprive people of their fundamental right to liberty from confine-
ment when confinement is necessary to serve a compelling govern-
mental interest. Only when courts apply such scrutiny to the criminal
law will it be possible to say that prison is an acceptable place to put
criminals because they deserve no better. Only then will the word
"crime" justifiably evoke society's outrage and its passion for
retribution.
274 Ex Parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874).
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